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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Piercing the corporate veil”—the phrase conjures up the 
tantalising pursuit of an exotic being whose identity is shrouded in 
mystery. Unfortunately, the guiding principles for judicial veil piercing 
are almost as elusive as the creature behind the veil itself. 
Every trial lawyer has experienced the thrill of obtaining a 
money judgment after a long and hard-fought trial only to experience 
the disappointment of learning that the corporate defendant is 
bankrupt. The client is furious and demands to know what the lawyer 
is going to do. The client asks: “Why can’t you go after the 
shareholder?” Full of the bravado of victory, the lawyer reassures the 
client that it can be done. But when the lawyer goes to the library and 
looks up the case law, he comes away confused. 
The question of what it takes to pierce the corporate veil is one 
that should be of interest to all multinational corporations that engage 
in international trade through local subsidiaries incorporated in other 
countries. After all, one of the reasons that large listed companies 
incorporate subsidiaries in other countries is to shield the holding 
company from claims arising in the jurisdiction in which the subsidiary 
is situated. The risk of the holding company incurring personal liability 
for the debts of its foreign subsidiaries is therefore an important one 
for parent companies to consider before commencing business 
through a subsidiary in another country. The English law principles in 
relation to corporate veil piercing are of international significance 
because the corporate laws of many countries in the British 
commonwealth are influenced by English law. 
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This article primarily explores the principles that apply in the 
quest to pierce the corporate veil under English and South African law. 
In order to assist international lawyers advising multi-national 
corporations, it also compares the laws of England and South Africa 
with the laws of the United States. This comparative analysis shows 
that all three legal systems are guided by similar principles, although 
they have some differences. However, variations in outcome from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction may have more to do with the public policy 
of the forum in which the matter is tried than real differences in 
principle. 
Veil piercing is an equitable remedy. As there is no end to 
human ingenuity when it comes to concocting dishonest business 
schemes, courts in the three subject jurisdictions have correctly 
refrained from attempting to definitively state what the exact 
parameters of the doctrine are. However, this understandable 
reluctance has resulted in a case by case type of approach in all of the 
subject jurisdictions that is not always consistent in its outcomes. One 
Australian judge commented that “there is no common, unifying 
principle, which underlies the occasional decision of the courts to 
pierce the corporate veil. Although an ad hoc explanation may be 
offered by a court which so decides, there is no principled approach to 
be derived from the authorities. . . .”1 
This judicial observation may overstate the haphazard nature 
of corporate veil piercing. Courts have laid down general principles as 
to when this drastic remedy will be allowed. The application of the law 
to the facts has however led to inconsistent results. These 
inconsistencies have more to do with the public morals of the time 
when, and the place where, piercing is sought. Nevertheless, many of 
the outcomes are reasonably predictable. 
The English courts have shown themselves to be very 
conservative in going behind the veil.2 In South Africa, under the 
                                                 
 1 Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd [1989] 16 NSWLR 549, 567 (Austl.). See 
Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) at para. 15 (S. Afr.). 
 2 See generally Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council [1978] SC 90 (HL) (Eng.) 
(It “is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist 
indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.”); Adams v. Cape Industries 
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influence of the nation’s new democratic Constitution, the general 
principles have been liberalised, although successful veil piercing 
remains a rarity.3 
The general principles applicable in the various American 
jurisdictions are not inherently more liberal than those that apply in 
South Africa.4 However, an empirical study has shown that veil 
piercing is one of the most litigated areas of corporate law in the United 
States and that the plaintiff has been successful on average in 
approximately 40% of reported cases.5 Veil piercing claims also tend 
to be more successful in specific states. 6 
This article evaluates and compares the principles and cases 
applicable to corporate veil piercing in England, South Africa and the 
United States and attempts to identify, as much as possible, a common 
thread that will unravel the veil. Part II of the article discusses the legal 
principles applicable to veil piercing in the United Kingdom. Part III 
reviews certain basic principles of South African common law and 
corporate law as well as the legal principles applicable to veil piercing 
in South Africa. Part IV contains a brief comparative overview of the 
law of the various jurisdictions of the United States appertaining to veil 
piercing.7 
                                                 
PLC [1990] Ch 433 (Eng.) (rejecting the single economic unit concept of liability in 
a corporate group and holding that there was no general principle that “all companies 
in a group of companies are to be regarded as one.”); Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 
1 FLR 115 (Eng.) (In order for the court to pierce the corporate veil “it is necessary 
to show both control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is, 
(mis)use of the company by them as a device or façade to conceal their wrongdoing.”) 
 3 See Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at 594 
para. 22 Ex Parte Gore NO 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 396 para. 28. 
 4 See generally DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 
681 (4th Cir. 1976); Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 287 N.Y.S. 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1936), aff’d, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936); Japan Petroleum Co.v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F. 
Supp. 831 (D. Del. 1978). 
 5 Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 
CORNELL 76 L.REV. 1036, 1048 (1991). 
 6 Id. at 1050–1054. (indicating that the percentage of successful veil piercing 
cases in CA was 45% but 0% in Delaware). 
 7 Citations in this Article to South African judgments are mainly to cases 
reported in various published South African Law Reports, which are obtainable both 
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As the outcomes in veil piercing cases are fact driven, this 
article includes comprehensive analysis of the facts of many of the 
cases in an effort to extract general principles. 
II. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ENGLAND 
A. The Concept of Juristic Personality 
Importantly, “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct 
from the members who compose it.”8 This means that the assets of 
the company vest in the company and not its shareholders. Usually, 
the shareholders of the company have no liability for the company’s 
debts.9 
Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower,10 arguably the most 
authoritative writer on English company law, notes that one of the 
primary purposes for the introduction of the limited liability company 
in England during the mid-nineteenth century was to “facilitate the 
investment by members of the public, who were not professional 
investors, of their surplus funds in the many large capital projects,” 
                                                 
online and in hard copy. There are also references to certain cases that are not 
reported in the ordinary Law Reports but appear on websites such as Southern 
African Legal Information Institute (“SAFLII”) or Judgments Online (“JOL”). Cases 
that have the letters “CC” at the end of the citation were decided by the South 
African Constitutional Court. Cases that have the acronym “SCA” are decided by the 
South African Supreme Court of Appeal. References to “ZASCA” are SCA cases 
reported only on the SCA’s website. References to “AD” are references to the 
Appellate Division, the previous name of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The article 
also contains references to English cases. A reference to “All ER” is a reference to 
the All England Law Reports. A reference to “QB” is a reference to the Queen’s 
Bench. 
 8 Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 550 (S. Afr.); Cape Pacific 
Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 802F (S. Afr.); 
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) (Eng.). 
 9 Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd. v. Ebrahim 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) at 306 para. 6 
(S. Afr.). 
 10 P.B. Morice, Obituary: Professor Laurence Gower, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 12, 
1998, 1:02 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/obituary-
professor-laurence-gower-1144314.html. 
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such as the construction of railways.11 Public investors lacking 
expertise in administering companies would be considerably 
discouraged from buying shares in those companies “if the full range 
of their personal assets were to be put at risk.”12 
Furthermore, limited liability “facilitates the operation of 
public securities markets, because it relieves the investor of the need 
to be concerned about the personal wealth of fellow investors.”13 
As the whole purpose of limited liability is to afford 
shareholders/investors (who may or may not be closely associated 
with the company) the benefit and protection of limited liability, the 
courts in modern mercantile jurisdictions are naturally reluctant to 
pierce the corporate veil and declare shareholders liable for the debts 
of the companies in which they have invested. This is particularly so 
where the company’s members own publicly traded securities.14 The 
entire modern investment structure and the fluidity of investment 
funds is premised upon limited liability. It stands to reason that courts 
will only venture to pierce the corporate veil in the most extreme 
situations. 
One of the earliest attempts to pierce the corporate veil in 
England arose in the seminal case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.15 In 
that case, a trader sold a solvent business to a limited liability company 
with a nominal capital of 40,000 shares of £1 each, the company 
consisting only of the vendor, his wife, a daughter and four sons, who 
                                                 
 11 PAUL L. DAVIES ET AL., GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW 191–92 (10th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GOWER’S PRINCIPLES]. 
 12 Id. at 192. 
 13 Id. (citing Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980)). 
 14 See GOWER’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 11, at 206; THOMPSON, supra note 5, 
at 1054–56. Apart from the court’s policy aversion to piercing the corporate veil in 
listed companies, the requisites for corporate veil piercing of listed companies in any 
jurisdiction are in any event unlikely to be present because: (i) it is rare for any one 
person or entity to dominate a listed company so completely that it would justify 
piercing the corporate veil; and (ii) publicly traded companies are heavily regulated 
so that instances of undercapitalisation and failure to observe corporate formalities 
are likely to be rare. 
 15 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
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subscribed for one share each.16 All the terms of the sale were known 
and approved by the shareholders.17 
As partial payment of the purchase price for the business, 
debentures forming a floating security were issued to the vendor, 
Salomon.18 Over 20,000 shares were also issued to him and were paid 
for out of the purchase-money.19 These shares gave the vendor the 
power to outvote the six other shareholders.20 No shares other than 
these 20,007 were ever issued.21 All requirements of the Companies 
Act 1862 were complied with.22 The vendor was appointed managing 
director.23 Bad times came, and the company was wound up (i.e. placed 
in bankruptcy).24 After satisfying the debentures there was not enough 
to pay the ordinary creditors.25 
After the company went into liquidation (i.e. an English form 
of bankruptcy), the liquidators (i.e. English corporate bankruptcy 
trustees) lodged a defence to a claim by the shareholder/vendor, 
Salomon, to enforce the debentures that had been issued to the 
company and brought a counter-application seeking to have Salomon 
indemnify the creditors of the company for the company’s losses.26 
The liquidators were initially successful in the lower court.27 
However, the House of Lords held that Salomon was a completely 
separate entity from the company, with the result that the debentures 
were enforceable.28 Salomon could not be held personally liable for the 
debts of the company.29 The liquidators sought to argue that Salomon 
                                                 
 16 Id. at 22. 
 17 Id. at 23. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 23. 
 26 Id. at 24–26. 
 27 Id. at 26. 
 28 Id. at 30–33. 
 29 Id. at 23. 
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was the dominant personality in the company and that his co-
shareholders, who were all family members with a minority 
shareholding, were in effect not real shareholders but were simply 
issued shares to enable the company to comply with the relevant 
statute which required seven shareholders.30 
The principal judgment of the court was delivered by Lord 
Halsbury.31 He reasoned that the company in bankruptcy was a valid 
“artificial creation” of the Legislature (in the form of the Companies 
Act of 1862)32 and had been validly constituted.33 As long as the 
company was properly constituted, the court could not add 
requirements for a valid corporation that were not in the statute.34 
“[T]here were seven actual living persons who held shares in the 
company” as was required by the Companies Act.35 The statute did not 
require that any one of the seven shareholders hold more than one 
share or that they hold the shares in various proportions.36 The fact 
that Salomon was the dominant shareholder and that the other 
shareholders generally did his bidding did not render him personally 
liable for the debts of the company.37 Even if the formation of the 
company was “a mere scheme to enable Aron Salomon to carry on 
business in the name of the company[,]” that would not be contrary to 
the intent of the Companies Act.38 
Lord Halsbury emphasised that a company that was “legally 
incorporated . . . must be treated like any other independent person 
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself[;]” the incorporators’ 
                                                 
 30 Id. at 28–29. 
 31 Id. at 29–34. Lord Halsbury was one of England’s greatest jurists and the 
first editor of Halsbury’s Laws of England. 1 Halsbury’s Laws of England: 5th Ed: 
(2008) Introduction. 
 32 i.e. the Companies Act of 1862. 
 33 Id. at 29. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 30. 
 37 Id. at 30–31. 
 38 Id. 
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motives are not relevant to an evaluation of “what those rights and 
liabilities are.”39 
Lord Watson added that, even if Salomon formed the 
company in order to limit his liabilities, he simply “availed himself to 
the full of the advantages offered by the Companies Act [of] 1862” and 
that there was nothing wrong with that.40 This was a perfectly 
legitimate use of corporate personality. 
In short, creditors of a company who chose to deal with the 
company, instead of the individual shareholder behind the company, 
cannot later be heard to complain that the incorporator should be 
denied the benefits of the limited liability even when that is the very 
reason that he incorporated the company. Despite the fact that a 
company is an entity separate and distinct from its members, there are 
times when the court will pierce or lift the corporate veil to have regard 
to the identity of the shareholders behind it. 
In Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Limited The Coral 
Rose (No 1), the English court distinguished between “piercing” the 
corporate veil and “lift[ing]” it.41 The veil is “pierce[d]” where the 
rights or liabilities of a company are treated as the rights or liabilities 
of the shareholders. “Lift[ing]” the corporate veil or “look[ing] behind 
it” occurs when the court, “for some legal purpose,” has regard to the 
identity of the shareholders in the company.42 
In Atlas Maritime, a subsidiary company had borrowed money 
from its parent to purchase and repair a damaged vessel.43 The plaintiff 
obtained a Mareva injunction44 to freeze the subsidiary’s assets to 
                                                 
 39 Id. at 30. 
 40 Id. at 51–52. 
 41 Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 769. 
 42 Id. at 779. 
 43 Id. at 769. 
 44 Id. A Mareva injunction is an English form of injunction, the parameters 
of which were first enunciated in Mareva Cia Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarrier SA 
(“The Mareva”) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509. In certain circumstances, the court will 
grant an injunction pending litigation to prevent the defendant from disposing of 
those assets until the litigation is concluded. See COLIN B. PREST, THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERDICTS 103–19 (1996). 
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protect them from dissipation.45 The holding company, as a loan 
creditor of the subsidiary, sought to lift the injunction so the debt owed 
to it could be repaid by the subsidiary.46 The court held that this was 
not a case for piercing the corporate veil in the sense of saddling the 
holding company with the liability of the subsidiary.47 However, the 
court could lift the veil and look behind the debtor company and 
determine that the creditor was in fact the parent of the debtor 
company that had been enjoined.48 Once the identity of the 
shareholder was recognised and the holding company and creditor 
were revealed as one and the same, the repayment could not be said to 
be a repayment in the ordinary course of business and the injunction 
could not be lifted.49 As appears from the cases cited below, courts in 
England and in South Africa have been far more willing to lift the veil 
than they have been to pierce it.50 
Daimler Co. Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great 
Britain) Limited was one of the earliest cases in which an English court 
pierced or lifted the corporate veil.51 The case came before the Privy 
                                                 
 45 Atlas Maritime Co. SA v. Avalon Maritime Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 769 at 
769. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 779. 
 48 Id. at 779–80. 
 49 Id. at 779–81. 
 50 See generally Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA) (Eng.) 
(looking behind the veil to prevent a shareholder who had signed a non-compete 
agreement with the plaintiff from effectively conducting business in violation of the 
restraint through a company). Le’Bergo Fashion CC v. Lee 1998 (2) SA 608 (C) (S. Afr.); 
Die Dros (Pty) Ltd. v. Telefon Beverages CC 2003 (4) SA 207 (C) at 215 para. 24 (S. Afr.); 
Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 (disregarding the separate legal personality of 
the company where the company was used to avoid a contractual obligation); Cape 
Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) (S. Afr.) ; 
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (Eng.) (holding that 
a company whose shareholders were enemy German nationals was an “enemy” 
trading with England in violation of war regulations); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd. [1972] 2 All ER 492 (HL) (Eng.) (recognizing in a shareholder dispute 
that there were shareholders behind the company with “rights, expectations and 
obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure”); 
Erasmus v. Pentamed Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1982 (1) SA 178 (W) (S. Afr.) (following the 
approach of the House of Lords in Ebrahami when it held that a closely held 
corporation was in substance a partnership). 
 51 Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) (Eng.). 
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Council during the First World War. The court held that a company 
incorporated in England, whose majority shareholders were all 
German nationals residing in Germany, was an enemy “alien.”52 As a 
result, the company could not sue for payment of a debt owed to it 
that arose before the war commenced because the defendant was not 
permitted to “pay any sum of money to or for the benefit of an 
enemy.”53 
Lord Halsbury, enunciated the general principle that “when the 
object to be obtained is unlawful the indirectness of the means by 
which it is to be obtained will not get rid of the unlawfulness. . . .”54 
The court held that in that case “the object of the means adopted [was] 
to enable thousands of pounds to be paid to the King’s enemies.”55 
The general principle stipulated above is the foundation upon 
which successful English veil piercing cases have been based right up 
to the present day. This principle is entirely consistent with the body 
of jurisprudence that the English Courts have developed with regard 
to corporate veil piercing. However, the application of the general 
principle to the facts of the cases is not always uniform. 
Lord Halsbury56 reasoned that: (i) before the war commenced 
“an associated body of Germans availed themselves of our English law 
to carry on a business for manufacturing motor car tyres in Germany 
and selling them here in England. . . .”57 At that time there was nothing 
wrong with the shareholders’ action because Germany and England 
were at peace;58 (ii) however, after the war commenced the plaintiff 
company became little more than the “machinery” to accomplish an 
illegal purpose of “giving money[] to the enemy”59 (i.e. Germany); (iii) 
                                                 
 52 Id. at 316. 
 53 Id. at 332. 
 54 Id. at 315. Note how similar the language is to that of the South African 
court in: Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 at 507; Zandberg v. Van Zyl 1910 AD 
302 at 309; Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 at 544–548. 
 55 Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 315. 
 56 Halsbury also wrote the principal judgment in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
[1897] AC 22 (HL). 
 57 Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 315. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 316. 
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the company was not a living thing capable of loyalty and disloyalty.60 
Accordingly, the court looked to the shareholders to determine the 
enemy character of the company and concluded that the shareholders 
constituted a partnership in all but name;61 (iv) the court therefore set 
aside the veil to conclude that the company was being utilised as the 
machinery for performing an illegal purpose.62 
Lord Halsbury then concluded: 
[I]t seems to be too monstrous to suppose that for an 
unlawful, because, after a declaration of war, a hostile, 
purpose [a corporate] institution should be used, and 
[the] enemies of the State, while actually at war with us, 
be allowed to continue trading and actually to sue for 
their profits in trade in an English court of justice.63 
The emotive language used by Lord Halsbury64 suggests that 
the court’s decision may have been motivated more by patriotism than 
principle. The assertion that the plaintiff’s shareholders sought to 
obtain an unlawful object by an indirect means65 is simply not borne 
out by the facts. All actions by the plaintiff and its shareholders took 
place before the war and were legal.66 The company was incorporated 
and credit was extended to the defendant before the war had 
commenced.67 The notion that a company can be an enemy merely 
because its shareholders are enemy nationals is antithetical to the basic 
principle of corporate law — that the company is an entity separate 
and distinct from its shareholders.68 The time to stop payment to the 
“enemy” would have been when the company attempted to declare a 
                                                 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 316. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Phrases such as “the King’s enemies,” “monstrous to suppose” and 
“enemies of the State” Id. 
 65 Id. at 308. 
 66 Id. at 315. 
 67 Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 (HL) at 308. 
 68 Ironically this doctrine was first enunciated by Lord Halsbury himself in 
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 30. 
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dividend, not when it sought to recover a debt that was owing to it by 
a third party. 
The Daimler case is of importance for a number of reasons. 
First, it is probably the first case in which the House of Lords actually 
set aside or pierced the corporate veil and is therefore a landmark 
judgment. Second, it enunciated the general principle that, where a 
corporation is being used to circumvent the law, it is appropriate to 
pierce or set aside the veil. 
However, in evaluating the case in relation to a particular 
modern fact pattern with which any legal practitioner is presented, it is 
important to remember that the case is more of a product of its time 
than a reliable pointer as to how a court will find in future cases. The 
manner in which Lord Halsbury applied the law to the facts in the 
context of a war situation demonstrates the extent to which the 
ultimate outcome of corporate veil cases may be driven by public 
policy and the social milieu of the time. 
B. Subsidiary Companies in a Group and The Agency Principle 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the English 
courts flirted with a different approach to corporate veil piercing where 
the companies under consideration were part of a corporate group and 
the ultimate shareholder of those companies was also a corporation.69 
In that context, the courts allowed voluntary veil piercing (i.e. veil 
piercing sought by the shareholders themselves) on the basis that: (i) 
the subsidiary company was a mere agent of the holding company;70 or 
(ii) the companies in the group were a “single,” “economic entity” and 
were in substance a partnership.71 
                                                 
 69 See generally Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 
116; DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] 3 
All ER 462. 
 70 See Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116 at 120–
22. 
 71 DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
[1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467, 473. 
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In Smith, Stone and Knight Limited v. Lord Mayor, Aldermen and 
Citizens of the City of Birmingham the court pierced the corporate veil to 
assist shareholders in a company, not to hold them liable for the 
corporation’s debt.72 This is sometimes referred to as a “reverse 
piercing of the veil,”73 although voluntary piercing may be a better 
term. 
The claimant, Smith, Stone & Knight Limited (“Smith”) 
owned a property in the City of Birmingham.74 Smith had a subsidiary 
called the Birmingham Waste Company Limited (“the Waste 
Company”) which carried on business on the premises for the benefit 
of Smith.75 The subsidiary company (i.e. the Waste Company) was 
technically the entity that carried on business on the premises.76 The 
City of Birmingham wanted to purchase the property under its 
compulsory expropriation powers in order to build a technical 
college.77 In an effort to maximise the compensation to which Smith 
(the ultimate holding company) would be entitled, Smith made a claim 
for compensation, asserting that the subsidiary (which carried on 
business on the premises) was merely its agent and that the true owner 
of the business was Smith.78 The court upheld Smith’s claim on the 
basis that the Waste Company was a mere agent of Smith with no 
independent business of its own.79 
In concluding that the Waste Company was the agent of 
Smith,80 the Court utilised a series of questions that were usually used 
in tax cases:81 (i) were the profits of the subsidiary reported as the 
profits of the holding company? (ii) “were the person[s] conducting 
the business appointed by the parent company?” (iii) was the holding 
company the “head and brain of the trading venture?” (iv) did the 
                                                 
 72 Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116. 
 73 Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 380 para. 30 (S. Afr.) 
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 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 117. 
 78 Id. at 118. 
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holding company “govern the venture, decide what should be done” 
and what capital should be invested? (v) did the holding company 
“make the profits by its skill and direction?” (vi) was the holding 
company “in effectual and in constant control?”82 
Some of the factors that influenced the court in concluding 
that the Waste Company was an agent of Smith, were that the 
claimants kept all of the books and accounts of the Waste Company, 
“[t]here was no tenancy agreement of any sort” between Smith and the 
Waste Company, no rental payments, and, although the Waste 
Company was debited a pro rata share of the overheads this amounted 
to nothing more than a mere book entry.83 
It is important to emphasise that Smith resolved the case on the 
basis that the Waste Company was a mere agent of the claimant, Smith, 
so that the business that the Waste Company carried on was in 
substance the business of Smith.84 
The principles enunciated in Smith are at first blush appealing 
when a creditor of a subsidiary seeks to impress liability upon a 
company that is the sole shareholder of that subsidiary company. As 
the purpose of forming a business as a limited liability company is to 
protect individuals who choose to invest their capital in the company, 
one may well ask why a corporate holding company should have the 
same protections. 
However, in the Smith case, the court was not piercing the 
corporate veil in order to satisfy the claim of a jilted creditor of the 
subsidiary. The court was piercing the veil to assist the very 
                                                 
 82 Id. at 121. Cf. Hamilton v. Water Whole Int’l Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 794–
95 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 83 Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 All ER 116 at 119–
20. 
 84 Id. at 120–21, This agency principle resonates and bears similarity with 
American law. See Irwin & Leighton v. WM Anderson Co. 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del. Ch. 
1987) (“First the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient 
corporation and second, the dominant corporation must have proximately caused 
plaintiff harm through misuse of this control.”); Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, 
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 839–40 (D.Del. 1978); Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42, 45–
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shareholders that had created the corporate structure in the first place 
presumably because the court thought it seemed unfair to deprive 
them of fair compensation arising out of the expropriation. This seems 
to be an unsound basis for coming to the rescue of the shareholders. 
One might well ask whether the court would have been as quick to 
pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary to saddle liability on the 
holding company for a debt of the subsidiary. Where shareholders 
choose to hold property through a company, they have the benefit of 
limited liability, they should also have to suffer whatever disadvantages 
that may cause. Nevertheless, the agency principle may be an 
appropriate way to saddle the holding company with liability to a 
creditor to the extent that the courts will recognise it again in the 
future. 
A similar situation arose in DHN Food Distributors Limited v. 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets.85 That case also addressed a claim for 
compensation for expropriation by the City of London. The property 
was owned by a company called Bronze, which was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the claimant, DHN. DHN could not obtain 
compensation for the disruption of its business unless it could lift the 
corporate veil and treat Bronze as its alter ego.86 In a fairly robust 
judgment, Lord Denning, without referring at all to Smith, Stone & 
Knight, held that the veil should be lifted and that the holding company 
should be permitted to claim compensation for business disruption.87 
The reverse veil piercing that took place in DHN Food was 
accomplished with less analysis than in Smith, Stone & Knight. There 
was no attempt to hold that Bronze was a mere agent of DHN.88 
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The decision in DHN Food is of particular significance because, 
for the first time, it espoused the “single economic entity theory”— 
that companies in a group that were treated as one for the purpose of 
general accounts, balance sheets and profit and loss accounts were 
effectively a partnership and should be treated as one and the same 
entity.89 Lord Denning cited with approval to the well-known English 
company law academic, Gower, who had said that: “there is evidence of 
a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various 
companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity 
of the whole group.”90 
The decision in DHN Food has been criticised in other cases in 
other jurisdictions. In Pioneer Concrete Services Limited v. Yelnah (Pty) Ltd. 
and Others, an Australian court noted that DHN Food “gives one the 
impression that it is one of those ‘too hard’ cases in which judges have 
for policy reasons justified the lifting of the corporate veil in that 
particular case rather than the case which lays down any great new 
principle.”91 Piercing the corporate veil should be limited to situations 
where there is in fact and in law a partnership between companies in a 
group, or alternatively, where one of the companies is a mere “sham” 
or “façade.”92 
A similar situation came before the House of Lords in Woolfson 
v. Strathclyde Regional Council.93 This case also examined a claim for 
compensation from a regional council for expropriation where the real 
business was carried on by a holding company and not by the property 
owning subsidiary.94 
Although the claimants in Woolfson initially attempted to rely 
on Smith, Stone & Knight, they subsequently abandoned this argument 
                                                 
 89 DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
[1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd V Yelnah (Pty) Ltd (1986) 11 ACLR 108, 118–19 
(NSW). 
 92 Id. See also Ord v. Belhaven Pubs Ltd. [1998] 2 BCLC 447 (CA) at 456–57 
(Eng.)); Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 383–84 para. 35 (S. Afr.). 
 93 Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159 (HL) (Scot.). 
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because theirs was not a clear case of agency.95 However, they relied 
heavily on DHN Food, contending that the relevant companies “should 
all be treated as a single entity.”96 The claim was unsuccessful.97 
In delivering its judgment, the House of Lords was critical of 
DHN Food, although it distinguished it on the facts.98 The court 
expressed “some doubts” that in DHN Food Lord Denning “properly 
applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil 
only where special circumstances exist indicating that there is a mere 
fa[ç]ade concealing the true facts.”99 
This criticism of DHN Food is directed more towards the 
appropriateness of allowing a voluntary or reverse veil piercing than to 
the agency theory of liability. The whole concept of piercing the 
corporate veil is a device invented by the courts to prevent abuse of 
corporate personality in a manner that adversely prejudices third 
parties. It is ironic that the English courts have shown a greater 
willingness to invoke the agency principle to assist shareholders with a 
reverse or voluntary veil piercing than to apply it for the benefit of 
aggrieved third-party creditors of the company who have been left high 
and dry by a corporate structure that somehow squeaks through as 
genuine.100 
The issue of group liability and the single economic entity 
theory came up for consideration by the English Court of Chancery in 
the landmark case of Adams v. Cape Industries PLC.101 The case arose 
out of asbestos tort litigation initiated against an American company, 
NAAC.102 NAAC was a subsidiary of the defendant, Cape Industries 
                                                 
 95 Id. at 161. 
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 98 Id. at 161–62. 
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 100 The American “instrumentality” doctrine, which is intended to benefit 
third parties, requires that the behaviour of the majority shareholder is the proximate 
cause of the injury or loss complained of. See Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D. 
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 102 Id. at 929, 936. 
2019 The Mystery of the Corporate Veil 7:1 
133 
PLC.103 Cape Industries had a subsidiary called Cape Asbestos South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd (“CASAP”), a South African company, which mined 
asbestos in South Africa.104 
NAAC was an Illinois registered company that was formed for 
the purpose of marketing the asbestos products of CASAP in the 
United States.105 Although NAAC was a subsidiary of Cape Industries, 
it conducted business independently.106 It did its own marketing and 
had its own board and its own set of accounts.107 It paid U.S. taxes.108 
For purposes of its judgment, the court accepted that NAAC 
had been formed for the purpose of marketing asbestos in the United 
States because Cape Industries did not wish to expose itself to potential 
tort claims in the United States arising out of the purchase of 
asbestos.109 There was no evidence that Cape Industries exercised 
control over the commercial activities of NAAC.110 Although Cape 
Industries directed the level of dividend paid by NAAC and the level 
of permitted borrowing, the court held that “[s]uch corporate financial 
control was no more and no less than was to be expected in a group 
of companies such as the Cape Group.”111 There was no agency 
agreement between Cape Industries and NAAC.112 NAAC did not 
have authority to represent Cape Industries in any transactions.113 
At some point, Cape Industries had registered a company in 
Lichtenstein, Associated Mineral Corp (“AMC”), which it interposed 
between itself and NAAC.114 
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The plaintiff sued Cape Industries in Texas claiming damages 
for injury caused by exposure to asbestos dust emanating from an 
asbestos installation factory to which NAAC had supplied raw 
asbestos.115 Cape Industries took the position that it had no presence 
in Texas or in the United States and that, accordingly, the Texas court 
had no jurisdiction over it.116 Cape Industries therefore chose not to 
defend the lawsuit.117 A default judgment was obtained, and the 
plaintiffs sought to enforce the judgment in England.118 
Cape Industries defended the lawsuit initiated in England and 
maintained that the Texas court judgment could not stand against it 
because the Texas court had lacked personal jurisdiction.119 The 
question of whether the court had jurisdiction was to be decided under 
English law.120 English law would probably recognize jurisdiction over 
an overseas trading company when it was present within the 
jurisdiction of the court in the sense that it had “established and 
maintained at its own expense . . . a fixed place of business of its own 
in the [relevant] country and for more than a minimal period of time 
ha[d physically] carried on its own business at or from such premises 
by its servants or agents. . . .”121 
The central issue in Adams was, therefore, whether Cape 
Industries, through NAAC, had established a presence in the United 
States.122 If NAAC was the defendant’s agent in the United States or 
its alter ego, Cape Industries’ presence in the United States would be 
established and the judgment would be valid.123 The court concluded 
that NAAC was not the defendant’s agent in the United States or its 
alter ego. 124 
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First, the court considered the “single economic unit” 
argument and resoundingly rejected it. The court held that “[t]here is 
no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to 
be regarded as one.”125 “On the contrary, the fundamental principle is 
that ‘each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern 
concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and 
liabilities.’”126 
Next, the court considered whether it was appropriate to pierce 
the corporate veil. The court held that the authorities afforded little 
guidance on the principles to be utilised in deciding whether the 
“arrangements of a corporate group involve[ed] a façade. . . .”127 The 
court expressly refrained from “attempt[ing] a comprehensive 
definition of those principles.128 
The court held that AMC, the Lichtenstein company that been 
interposed between Cape Industries and NAAC, was “clearly a 
façade[,]” the “creature of Cape” and “no more than a corporate 
name.”129 Accordingly, it could be ignored and the court could deal 
with the matter as if the direct relationship of parent and subsidiary 
was between Cape Industries and NAAC.130 It was accordingly 
irrelevant whether AMC was a façade. The real question was whether 
NAAC was a façade or “creature of Cape.”131 
The court found that NAAC was a separate company 
conducting its own operations independently in the United States.132 
On its face, NAAC was not a façade.133 The question was whether the 
legal position changed because NAAC was incorporated for the 
specific purpose of insulating Cape Industries’ potential claims arising 
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out of consumers of asbestos in the United States.134 The court found 
that this did not change the position.135 
The court reasoned as follows: (i) there was no suggestion that 
there was any “actual or potential illegality or . . . inten[tion] to deprive 
any one of their existing rights[;]” (ii) whether or not the course 
adopted by Cape Industries “deserve[d] moral approval”, there was 
nothing illegal about the way Cape Industries organised its affairs; (iii) 
the fact that the company had deliberately organised its affairs so as to 
minimise its potential tortuous liability did not justify piercing the 
corporate veil.136 
In short, the fact that Cape Industries was itself a corporation 
did not prevent it from insulating itself from liability by trading 
through a subsidiary any more than Salomon was prevented from 
doing so in Salomon v Salomon & Co. For purpose of piercing the 
corporate veil, there was no difference in principle between a corporate 
or individual shareholder. 
Having rejected the argument that the corporate veil should be 
pierced, the court then considered whether NAAC was a mere agent 
of Cape Industries.137 If it was, the holding company, Cape Industries, 
could be liable for debts incurred by its agent on its behalf. In other 
words, the court implicitly accepted that a holding company can be 
held liable for the debts of its subsidiary on an agency principles and 
that such liability could arise independently of whether the subsidiary 
was a fraud, a façade or a sham.138 
The court concluded that NAAC was not a mere agent of Cape 
Industries.139 In reaching its conclusion, the court pointed to the 
following factors: (i) NAAC was itself the lessee of the premises from 
which it operated, paid rental to the landlord, owned its own office 
furniture, employed its own staff and ran its own pension scheme; (ii) 
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it conducted business “activities as principal on its own account,” 
among other things, buying asbestos from the United States 
Government and a source in Japan and selling them to United States 
customers; (iii) it stored the asbestos that it purchased from US 
Government stocks in warehousing facilities in its own name which it 
paid for; (iv) it earned profits and paid US taxes; (v) it paid dividends; 
and (vi) it observed all corporate formalities.140 
It is interesting to note how closely the factors relied on by the 
English court compare with the “template” of factors often considered 
by American courts in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil.141 
The Adams court then noted: 
There is no doubt that the services rendered by NAAC 
in acting as intermediary in respect of contracts 
between the United States customers and Egnep or 
Casap were active and important services which were 
of great assistance to Cape/Capasco in arranging the 
sales of their group’s asbestos in the United States. 
Nevertheless, for all the closeness of the relationship 
between Cape/Capasco and NAAC, strictly defined 
limits were imposed on the functions which NAAC 
were authorised to carry out or did carry out as their 
representative. First, NAAC had no general authority 
to bind Cape/Capasco to any contractual obligation. 
Second, . . . there is no evidence that NAAC, whether 
with or without prior authority from Cape/Capasco, 
ever effected any transaction in such manner that 
Cape/Capasco thereby became subject to contractual 
obligations to any person.142 
An interesting feature of the judgment from the perspective of 
English corporations with subsidiaries doing business in the United 
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States is that the English court chose to resolve the issue of veil 
piercing and agency under English law rather than under the law of the 
U.S. state in which the subsidiary, NAAC, was incorporated. In coming 
to this conclusion, the court reasoned that, in deciding whether to 
enforce a foreign judgment in England, the court had to consider 
whether English law recognised that Cape Industries had acquired a 
physical presence of its own in Illinois.143 In essence, the court appears 
to have treated the issue as more one of procedure than substance. 
The Cape Industries case is a landmark decision in England and 
reflects the current state of the law on this issue. The South African 
courts have also adopted the reasoning of the English Chancery 
Division in Cape Industries in approaching the liability of a holding 
company for the acts of its subsidiaries.144 
The reasoning of the court in Cape Industries, while 
conservative, is consistent with the more recent curbs placed upon the 
“single economic entity” approach to groups of companies by the 
House of Lords in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council.145 However, 
reading between the lines, another factor motivating the court in Cape 
Industries may have been a concern about opening the floodgates to 
foreign tort claims (especially from the U.S.) against English holding 
companies. In this connection, the Chancery Division was so critical 
of the manner in which the Texas judge dealt with the computation of 
the damages that it held that even if the corporate veil could have been 
pierced, the Texas judgment could not be enforced in England because 
there had not been a proper judicial assessment of the damages.146 This 
indicates yet again that the courts are frequently influenced in veil 
piercing cases by what they perceive to be public policy considerations. 
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Some academic writers maintain that tort claimants should be 
able to proceed against shareholders because, after all, they did not deal 
with the subsidiary voluntarily.147 However, there is a fallacy in this 
argument; veil piercing occurs because there has been fraud or 
improper conduct on the part of the shareholder in relation to a known 
third party, usually a creditor. Many torts do not involve unlawful 
conduct on behalf of the shareholder. On the other hand, if the 
shareholder is a party to the tort, the shareholder would be liable with 
the subsidiary on ordinary principles of tort law.148 This may be why 
cases in which tort claimants have been able to pierce the corporate 
veil are harder to find in any jurisdiction, even the United States.149 
It is also interesting how similar Cape Industries was to the 
approach of the U.S. Federal Court in Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. 
v. Ashland Oil150 when it rejected a claim arising out of Nigeria against 
a U.S. holding company for the debt of its Nigerian subsidiary engaged 
in oil exploration in Nigeria.151 
It is important to note that, in reaching its conclusion, the Cape 
Industries court did not reject the agency theory of holding company 
liability;152 it simply imposed tighter restrictions on when it could be 
applied. There is still scope for the agency principle where, for 
example, the subsidiary company is itself merely an investment holding 
company conducting no business activities of its own. 
Cape Industries was the death knell for the “single economic 
entity theory” of corporate groups in England. However, many lawyers 
may well mourn its passing. The purpose of conferring limited liability 
on companies was to enable individuals to invest in companies without 
                                                 
 147 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 69–71 (2d ed. 2010). 
 148 See generally Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 241 A.D. 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 
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putting their private assets at risk.153 It is hard to see how this purpose 
is served by protecting holding companies from the insolvency of their 
subsidiaries because, even when the holding company is held liable for 
the debts of the subsidiary, the personal assets of the ultimate 
shareholders in the holding company (who may be individuals) are not 
placed at risk. 
At the same time, the sacrosanct principle that a company is an 
entity that is separate and distinct from its shareholders is violated 
when the court fails to apply the law uniformly in the case of both 
individual and corporate shareholders. Another difficulty with the 
single economic entity theory is that its application significantly 
increases the business risk for multi-nationals where a subsidiary is 
located in a different country from the holding company as was the 
case in Cape Industries.154 
All in all, when one weighs up the factors for and against the 
single economic entity theory, the decision in Cape Industries makes 
sense from both a legal and a policy perspective because it stresses that 
a company is an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. 
C. The Company as a Façade or a Sham 
Another category of cases in which the English courts have 
pierced or gone behind the veil are those in which the court holds that 
the company is a mere “façade” or a “sham” calculated to carry out an 
improper purpose.155 Many of these are characterised by a robust 
expression of distaste by the court for the conduct of the defendant 
and a lack of careful jurisprudential reasoning. The result is a perceived 
lack of consistency in outcomes and a failure to set out clear 
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jurisprudential guidelines. As the cases are not always consistent, it is 
important that their facts be analysed individually.156 
In Gilford Motor Company Limited v. Horne, the court looked 
behind the veil to prevent a shareholder who had signed a non-
compete agreement with the plaintiff from effectively conducting 
business in violation of the restraint through a company.157 The court 
granted an injunction against both the shareholder (who had signed 
the non-compete undertaking) and the company that he was using to 
conduct business in an effort to circumvent the restraint.158 The Court 
held that the company that Horne had formed was “a mere cloak or a 
sham” to enable him to “engage in business” in violation of the non-
complete clause.159 Consequently, the court granted an injunction 
against the company as well as Horne, the defendant who had formed 
it as a vehicle to enable him to evade the provisions of the restraint.160 
It bears mentioning that, as robust as the court appeared to be 
in Gilford Motor Company, it did not go so far as to pierce the corporate 
veil to hold a shareholder liable for the debts of its subsidiary. It is also 
questionable whether it was necessary for the court to look behind the 
corporate veil at all to justify granting an injunction against the 
company which was in any event a party to the defendant’s breach of 
the non-complete clause.161 
In Jones v. Lipman, the first defendant agreed to sell freehold 
land with registered title to the plaintiffs for £5,250.162 Upon 
completion, the first defendant “sold and transferred the land to the 
second defendant company (having a capital of £100). . . .”163 The first 
defendant and his solicitors were the sole shareholders and directors 
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of the second defendant company.164 The second defendant company 
purchased the land for £3,000, “of which £1,564 was borrowed by the 
defendant company from a bank and the rest remained owing to the 
first defendant.”165 
The plaintiffs successfully sued for a decree of specific 
performance against both defendants to compel them to transfer the 
land concerned to the plaintiffs.166 The court followed Gilford Motor 
Company Limited v. Horne167 and Smith v. Hancock168 in holding that the 
company was “a device and a sham, a mask” that concealed the 
shareholders’ actions from “the eye of equity[.]”169 
Accordingly, Jones v Lipman was similarly a case in which the 
court went behind the veil, not to impose liability for a debt of the 
company, but to prevent the first defendant from using the company 
as a “sham” or a “mask” to effectively perpetrate a fraud against the 
plaintiffs.170 
The reasoning in Jones v. Lipman is terse, robust and to the 
point.171 There is an absence of detailed reasoning demonstrating yet 
again that the court’s conclusion was based more on fact than law. The 
court considered the actions of the Defendants so repulsive to equity 
that the remedy seemed obvious.172 
In Wallersteiner v. Moir, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
libel.173 The defendant had asserted that certain corporate transactions 
                                                 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 445. 
 167 Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA). 
 168 Smith v. Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377. 
 169 Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 at 445. 
 170 Id. at 444–45. In Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 
1995 (4) SA 790 (AD), the South African court granted a similar order in similar 
circumstances. 
 171 See Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442 at 444–45. 
 172 See id. This approach is very similar to the approach followed by the South 
African Chief Justice in Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 547 (“[A] 
transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly disguised so to escape the 
provisions of the law, but falls in truth within these provisions.”). 
 173 Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 3 All ER 217 (Eng). 
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were fraudulent. In the process of delivering judgment in favour of the 
defendant, Lord Denning MR pierced the corporate veil. He held: 
It is plain that Dr Wallersteiner used many companies, 
trusts, or legal entities as if they belonged to him. He 
was in control of them as much as any ‘one-man 
company’ is under the control of the one man who 
owns all the shares and is the chairman and managing 
director. He made contracts of enormous magnitude 
on their behalf on a sheet of notepaper, without 
reference to anyone else. . . . He used their moneys as 
if they were his own. When the money was paid to him 
for shares which he himself owned beneficially, he 
banked it in the name of IFT of Nassau. . . . His 
concerns always used as their bankers the Anglo-
Continental Exchange Ltd. That was a merchant bank 
in the City of London of which he was chairman and 
which he effectively controlled. . . . Even so, I am quite 
clear that they [the companies,] were just puppets of 
Dr Wallersteiner. He controlled their every movement. 
Each danced to his bidding. He pulled the strings. 
Noone else got within reach of them. Transformed 
into legal language, they were his agents to do as he 
commanded. He was the principal behind them. I am 
of the opinion that the court should pull aside the 
corporate veil and treat these concerns as being his 
creatures–for whose doings he should be, and is, 
responsible. At any rate, it was up to him to show that 
any one else had a say in their affairs and he never did 
so. . . .174 
The colourful descriptive language utilised by Lord Denning 
and the offhand way in which he concluded that the veil should be 
pierced perhaps demonstrates that in many cases where the corporate 
                                                 
 174 Id. at 237–38. It is also interesting to note how similar Lord Denning’s 
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veil is pierced the shareholder’s behaviour is so obviously wrong that 
is requires very little reasoning to hold him responsible for the acts of 
his corporation. Even so, this is not a case in which the corporate veil 
was pierced to render Dr. Wallersteiner liable for the debts of one of 
his companies but rather to get to the substance of whether he was 
behaving dishonestly. 
In Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd.175 the court 
defined the term “sham” in the veil piercing context as “acts done or 
documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended 
by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of 
creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from 
the actual legal rights and obligations . . . which the parties intended to 
create.”176 The court held that for a transaction to be a “sham” the 
parties must have “a common intention” that their acts or documents 
are intended to in fact create different legal rights and obligations to 
those that they appear to create.177 
In Yukong Line Limited of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of 
Liberia (No 2),178 the court applied the doctrine enunciated above in 
Snook’s case. In that case, the plaintiff had contracted with the first 
defendant, RIC. An individual, Yamvrias controlled RIC.179 After RIC 
breached its charter party contract with the plaintiff, Yamvrias caused 
RIC to transfer its cash assets, totalling $244,965.60, to another 
company that he controlled, LIC.180 The plaintiff sought to pierce the 
corporate veil and hold Yamvrias and LIC liable for RIC’s debt. The 
court refused to pierce the corporate veil because it concluded that the 
charter party contract between the parties was not a sham.181 
The approach of the court in Yukong Line is too literal. The 
question should not be whether the charter party contract was a 
                                                 
 175 Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] 1 All ER 518 
at 528. 
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 178 Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82. 
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genuine transaction but whether the transfer of funds from an 
insolvent company by the shareholder to another company that was 
also his puppet warranted piercing the corporate veil. The answer to 
that question should have been yes. 
In The “Tjaskemolen” (now named “Visvliet”),182 the court held 
that, where ownership of a sailing vessel had been transferred from A 
company to B company to avoid the ship being attached to satisfy the 
debt of the A company, the transfer was a sham or a façade.183 The 
basis of the court’s decision was that the transfer itself was a sham and 
therefore ownership had not passed.184 Accordingly, this case was not 
about veil piercing as much as setting aside a simulated transaction. 
Nevertheless, the court, in the process of delivering its judgment, 
seemed to rely in part upon cases in which the corporate veil was 
pierced.185 
The decision in Tjaskemolen can be juxtaposed against that of 
the court in Yukong Line. It was the transfer of assets to frustrate an 
attachment that was held to be a sham. The question of whether the 
underlying contract between the plaintiff and the original defendant 
was valid was irrelevant. In comparison, in Yukong, the court focused 
on the genuineness of the original contract between the plaintiff and 
the defendant rather than the transfer of assets which stripped the 
defendant of the ability to satisfy its obligations to the plaintiff.186 For 
reasons stated above, it is my opinion that the reasoning in Tjaskemolen 
is more likely to be correct than that in Yukong Line. 
In Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Limited,187 the defendant had 
divested itself of all of its assets in favour of another company owned 
by the same shareholders.188 The transferee of the assets agreed to be 
responsible for all of the trade debts of the transferor company but not 
                                                 
 182 The “Tjaskemolen” (now named “Visvliet”) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465. 
 183 Id. at 474. 
 184 Id. at 474–75. 
 185 Id. at 469–71; In Re A Company [1985] 1 B.C.C.99; Creasey v. 
Breachwood Motors Ltd. [1993] BCLC 480. 
 186 Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82 at 
95. 
 187 Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Limited [1993] BCLC 480. 
 188 Id. at 482–83. 
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the plaintiff’s claim against the transferor company for wrongful 
dismissal.189 The court pierced the corporate veil to enable the plaintiff 
to obtain satisfaction of his debt from the transferee company.190 
In Ord v. Belhaven Pubs Limited, the court disapproved of the 
decision in Creasey.191 In that case, the plaintiff, the legal owners of a 
public house, had transferred all of the land from which it conducted 
its operations to its holding company as part of a restructuring in which 
the land owned by various subsidiaries conducting various public 
house businesses was transferred to the holding company.192 The 
plaintiff contended that this left the defendant company as a shell 
unable to satisfy the plaintiff’s debt, and the plaintiff sought to pierce 
the corporate veil.193 The court refused to pierce the corporate veil, 
noting that the plaintiff had not pointed to any actual improprieties or 
fraud on the part of the defendant or its holding company.194 Yet, in 
the absence of impropriety or fraud, it was not necessary for the court 
to distinguish Creasey because that was a case where the transaction 
occurred with the deliberate intention of frustrating the plaintiff’s 
rights. 
In Gencor ACP Limited v. Dalby,195 the plaintiffs brought an 
action against D and M, the former director and company secretary, 
respectively, of a group of companies, “alleging misfeasance on their 
part in misapplying money and other property belonging to the ACP 
Group. . . .”196 The unlawful profits made by the director had been 
channelled through Burnstead Limited, a British Virgin Islands 
company controlled by one of the director defendants, Dalby.197 The 
Chancery Division pierced the corporate veil and held that those 
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 190 Id. at 491–93. 
 191 Ord. v Belhaven Pubs Ltd. [1998] 2 BCLC 447 (CA). 
 192 Id. at 447, 450–51. 
 193 Id. at 453. 
 194 Id. at 456. 
 195 Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (Ch.D.). 
 196 Id. at 734–35. 
 197 Id. at 739, 742 paras. 10, 19. 
2019 The Mystery of the Corporate Veil 7:1 
147 
profits that had accrued to Burnstead were in fact profits of the 
director defendant, Dalby.198 
The delinquent director, Dalby, argued that he was not 
accountable to the plaintiff company, ACP, for the commission 
because he did not receive it personally.199 It went instead to Burnstead, 
a separate company.200 Burnstead he argued, was not in a fiduciary 
relationship to ACP.201 
The court rejected this argument.202 The court noted that 
Burnstead was wholly owned by Dalby and that “nobody else had any 
beneficial interest.”203 Burnstead had no “sales force, technical team or 
other employees capable of carrying on any business.”204 All it did was 
make and receive payments. In effect, it was nothing more than 
“Dalby’s offshore bank account held in a nominee name.”205 
The court concluded that Burnstead was simply Dalby’s alter 
ego and agent and that the corporate veil should be “lift[ed]” with the 
result that Burstead must pay the funds over to the plaintiff 
company.206 
Once again, this is not a case in which the corporate veil was 
pierced or lifted in order to hold the shareholder liable for the debts of 
a puppet company. On the contrary, it is a case where the corporate 
veil was set aside in order to hold the puppet company liable for the 
debts of the shareholder. The case is consistent with the decision in 
Adams that held that one of the subsidiary companies of the defendant, 
Cape Industries, that had been interposed between the defendant and 
its American subsidiary was a façade because it conducted no business 
activities of its own for its own account. 
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A similar situation arose in Trustor AB v. Smallbone (No 2).207 
The defendant, Smallbone, was the managing director of a company, 
Trustor.208 In breach of his fiduciary duty, he caused Trustor to transfer 
funds to Introcom Limited, a company which he controlled.209 The 
plaintiff argued that the circumstances warranted the court “piercing 
the corporate veil” and recognising that the receipt of funds by 
Introcom was a receipt of funds by Smallbone.210 The court held that 
the authorities cited to it permitted the corporate veil to be pierced 
“where the company was shown to be a fa[ç]ade or sham with no 
unconnected third party involved.”211 It then held: 
In my view these conclusions are such as to entitle the 
court to recognise the receipt of the money of Trustor 
by Introcom as the receipt by Mr Smallbone too. 
Introcom was a device or fa[ç]ade in that it was used as 
the vehicle for the receipt of the money of Trustor. Its 
use was improper as it was the means by which Mr 
Smallbone committed unauthorised and inexcusable 
breaches of his duty as a director of Trustor.212 
The decisions in Gencor and Trustor are consistent. They 
indicate that where a director, acting in breach of his fiduciary duty, 
uses another entity that he controls as a vehicle to misappropriate 
funds or seize a corporate opportunity, the court will pierce the 
corporate veil to ensure that no injustice is done to the company.213 
In view of the apparent inconsistencies in outcomes in the 
cases set out in the subsection above it may seem hard to extrapolate 
a general principle. However, some central principles can be extracted. 
                                                 
 207 Trustor AB v. Smallbone [2001] 3 All ER 987. 
 208 Id. at 987, 989. 
 209 Id. at 990 paras. 4–8. 
 210 Id. at 987 and 995 para. 23, 996. 
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 213 This was also the approach of the South African court in Robinson v. 
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. 1921 AD 168 at 194, where the court treated a 
trust (not a corporation) as the alter ego of the defendant Robinson who had seized 
a corporate opportunity from Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company and 
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First, in cases where a company has been set up in order to enable an 
individual or a company to escape a contractual obligation, the court 
will usually go behind the veil and look at the shareholder who is 
behind the company that is being used to commit the subterfuge.214 
Second, in most of the cases referred to in this section in which the 
plaintiff was successful, the court did not declare the shareholder liable 
for the debts of the company. Rather, the court went behind the façade 
of the company and held the company liable or responsible for the acts 
of its shareholders. So, for example, in Gilford Motor Company215 and 
Jones v Lipman,216 the court identified the company with the shareholder 
to prevent the shareholder from using the company to circumvent a 
contractual obligation. Similarly, in Gencor217 the court required a 
company to repay money that a shareholder had misappropriated from 
another company in breach of his fiduciary duty as a director. 
Lastly, Certain of these cases, however, have adopted a more 
conservative approach, showing a willingness to go behind the veil 
only where the original transaction is a sham.218 In these cases, the 
court declined to examine a subsequent transaction by which one of 
the defendants disposed of assets to a related party defendant, taking 
the position that, because the underlying transaction was valid, the 
second transaction was irrelevant. 
D. Summary of the English Law Principles 
The state of the English law with regard to corporate veil 
piercing has been well summarised in Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif.219 The 
court, in matrimonial proceedings, was asked to pierce the corporate 
veil in order to hold that a property in which the wife resided that was 
                                                 
 214 See generally Gilford Motor Co. v. Hall [1933] Ch 935 (CA); Jones v. 
Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442; Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (AC); 
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 217 Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734 (AC). 
 218 Snook v. London & West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] All ER 518; 
Yukong Line Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82. 
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owned by a corporation was in fact property of the husband.220 The 
husband was not the sole shareholder in the company—his children 
also held shares.221 The husband had respected the separate corporate 
personality of the company, and all monies that he borrowed from the 
company were reflected as borrowings.222 The court refused to pierce 
the corporate veil.223 In reaching its conclusion the court emphasised, 
as many other cases have, that there was no intrinsic virtue or “magic” 
in the term “façade” which is usually now used to connote “an outward 
appearance or front, especially a deceptive one[.]”224 The term cannot 
be used to cover up a failure of proper legal analysis. 
The court then set out the following rules for piercing the 
corporate veil: 
In the first place, ownership and control of a company 
are not of themselves sufficient to justify piercing the 
veil. . . . Secondly, the court cannot pierce the 
corporate veil, even where there is no unconnected 
third party involved, merely because it is thought to be 
necessary in the interests of justice. . . . Thirdly, the 
corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some 
“impropriety”.225 Fourthly, the court cannot, on the 
other hand, pierce the corporate veil merely because 
the company is involved in some impropriety. The 
                                                 
 220 Id. at 115, 134–35. 
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impropriety must be linked to the use of the company 
structure to avoid or conceal liability. . . . Fifthly, it 
follows from all this that if the court is to pierce the 
veil it is necessary to show both control of the company 
by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is, (mis)use 
of the company by them as a device or façade to 
conceal their wrongdoing. . . . Finally, and flowing 
from all this, a company can be a façade even though 
it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive 
intent.226 The question is whether it is being used as a 
façade at the time of the relevant transaction(s). And 
the court will pierce the veil only insofar as it is 
necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong 
which those controlling the company have done. In 
other words, the fact that the court pierces the veil for 
one purpose does not mean that it will necessarily be 
pierced for all purposes.227 
The statement that “the court will pierce the veil only insofar 
as is necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong which 
those controlling the company have done” has been regarded as 
erroneous.228 In VTB Capital,229 the court rejected a submission that 
there was “no such principle as ‘piercing the veil[.]’” Having regard to 
prior decisions, including Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council230 and 
Adams v. Cape Industries PLC231 the court held that it was no longer open 
to it “to question the existence of the ‘veil piercing’ principle.”232 
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An analysis of the cases demonstrates that in recent years, the 
English courts have approached corporate veil piercing in a more 
conservative manner; the English courts consider the company to be 
an important instrument for commerce and will not easily go behind 
the veil.233 The courts have shown themselves less reluctant to pierce 
the corporate veil where this will not result in holding a shareholder 
liable for the debt of the company that it controls.234 The courts are 
also more willing to pierce the corporate veil to saddle a company with 
the liability of its shareholder in order to assist a plaintiff company to 
recover funds that were transferred to another entity controlled by one 
of the plaintiff’s directors in breach of the fiduciary duties of that 
director.235 
The fact that the shareholder sought to be held liable for the 
debts of the corporation is a company not an individual does not make 
the claim to pierce the corporate veil any stronger.236 The concept that 
companies in a group constitute a single economic unit should be 
treated as one that has now been rejected.237 There is still room for the 
argument that a holding company may be liable for the debts of its 
subsidiary where the subsidiary does no business of its own and is 
simply a conduit or agent for the activities of the holding company.238 
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III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South African common law is essentially Roman-Dutch in 
origin but is influenced by English law, especially where Roman-Dutch 
law required further development in order to bring it into line with 
modern economic structures.239 
A. Equity in South African Law 
Generally speaking, South African courts are not courts of 
equity and are not usually empowered to apply equitable principles.240 
However, where the common law or statute specifically calls for or 
contains an equitable principle, the court will be empowered to employ 
that concept.241 
In approaching corporate veil piercing, the South African 
courts have utilised an old Roman law maxim plus enim valet quod agitur 
quam quod simulate concipitur — “that which is done is of more avail than 
that which seems to have been done.”242 To put it in more modern 
terms, a court will give effect to the substance rather than to the form 
of a transaction. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this 
principle as “the doctrine of simulation.” 
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In Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn,243 the court held: “[i]t is a well known 
principle of our law that Courts of law will not be deceived by the form 
of a transaction: [they] will rend aside the veil in which the transaction 
is wrapped and examine its true nature and substance.”244 
In Zandberg v. Van Zyl,245 South Africa’s newly established 
Appellate Division attempted to define the doctrine of simulation as 
follows: 
Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express 
themselves in language calculated without subterfuge 
or concealment to embody the agreement at which 
they have arrived. They intend the contract to be 
exactly what it purports; and the shape which it 
assumes is what they meant it should have. Not 
frequently, however (either to secure some advantage 
which otherwise the law would not give, or to escape 
some disability which otherwise the law would 
impose), the parties to a transaction endeavour to 
conceal its real character. They will call it by a name, or 
give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise 
its true nature. And when a Court is asked to decide 
any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so 
by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not 
what in form it purports to be. The maxim then applies 
plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. But the 
words of the rule indicate its limitations. The Court 
must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely 
ascertainable, which differs from the simulated 
intention. For if the parties in fact meant that a contract 
shall have effect in accordance with its tenor, the 
circumstances that the same object might have been 
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attained in another way will not necessarily make the 
arrangement other than it purports to be.246 
It may seem anachronistic, but this ancient Roman law 
doctrine that was enunciated more than a millennium ago is the legal 
and equitable basis for piercing the corporate veil in modern South 
African company law.247 Simulation is as old as law and commerce. The 
simple application of this doctrine helps to unpack the mass of case 
law that seeks to explain whether the corporate veil should or should 
not be pierced. When this principle is applied in the context of 
corporate veil piercing it can explain why it is perfectly acceptable for 
a business person to use a corporate structure to avoid personal liability 
for the debts of the company provided that he keeps the corporate 
structure separate from his own affairs. Where the shareholder and the 
subsidiaries are comingled, it may then be appropriate to give effect to 
the substance over the form.248 
Although the approach of the South African courts to the 
application of equity (as opposed to legal) principles has not officially 
changed in recent times, the enactment of South Africa’s first 
democratic constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996 (“the Constitution”), has made it theoretically 
possible to broaden the scope of equity based on Constitutional 
principles. It has certainly encouraged the South African judiciary to 
adopt a less legalistic approach. In this respect, Section 39(2) of the 
Constitution requires that “when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”249 
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In Everfresh Market Virginia v. Shoprite Checkers,250 the 
Constitutional Court, in a non-binding obiter dictum,251 indicated that the 
infusion of the common law of contract with constitutional values 
should incorporate “values of ubuntu,252 which inspire much of [South 
Africa’s] constitutional compact.”253 “[Ubuntu] emphasises the 
communal nature of society and ‘carries in it the ideas of humaneness, 
social justice and fairness. . . .’”254 In the new constitutional milieu, 
under the influence of these principles, there has been some 
movement in the direction of liberalising the veil piercing remedy.255 
B. Sources of South African Company Law 
South African corporate law is heavily influenced by English 
company law. Notably, “[t]he first Southern African Companies Act, 
the Cape Joint Stock Companies Limited Liability Act of 1861 was 
based on prior English companies legislation.”256 Similarly, the first 
South African Companies Act enacted after South Africa became the 
Union of South Africa, the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926, 
was also based on English statutory law.257 As the South African 
company law was largely based on English company law, the “inner 
common law of companies,” being the courts’ decisions interpreting 
sections of the Companies Act, was also based upon English law.258 
While English judicial decisions in connection with the English 
Companies Act are not binding on South African courts, they are 
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afforded great respect.259 However, when looking at English 
precedents, differences in the respective legal systems and statutes 
must be taken into account.260 
The Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the Old Companies Act”) 
followed the South African Companies Act 46 of 1926. It was based 
fairly closely upon English law concepts. The Companies Act 71 of 
2008 (“the New Companies Act”), while following the essential 
English law construct, provided for significant changes in the Old 
Companies Act which were primarily intended to promote flexibility 
and accountability.261 
The South African law appertaining to corporate veil piercing 
prior to the enactment of the 2008 Act follows closely on English 
law.262 Section 20(9) has for the first time introduced a statutory basis 
for piercing the corporate veil. However, section 20(9) has not replaced 
the common law on piercing the corporate veil. If anything, it creates 
broad grounds for liability and is therefore supplemental to the 
common law.263 The introduction of a statutory basis for piercing the 
corporate veil will probably, over time, have the effect of expanding 
and liberalising the common law grounds for veil piercing.264 
C. The Early Cases 
The seminal South African case that first grappled with the 
issue of the corporate veil is Dadoo Limited v. Krugersdorp Municipal 
Council.265 The situation that arose in that case has similarities to 
Daimler;an early apartheid statute prohibited land ownership by 
“Asiatics” except in certain specific delineated areas.266 The 
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shareholders in the plaintiff were both “Asiatics” within the meaning 
of the statute.267 They incorporated a company with the object of 
acquiring and trading in land.268 The company purchased a property in 
the city of Krugersdorp.269 The Krugersdorp Municipal Council sought 
to set aside the transfer of the land to the company on the basis that 
the company’s acquisition of the land was “an evasion of the[] spirit 
and intent” of the legislation—i.e., it was in fraudem legis.270 The 
Appellate Division rejected this argument.271 
In reaching its decision, South Africa’s second Chief Justice 
Innes, enunciated the following principles: (i) citing to Salomon the 
Court affirmed that a company is “a legal persona distinct from the 
members who compose it[;]”272 (ii) the company is not legally “the 
agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them[;]” (iii) the position is not 
changed where only one person controls all the shares in the company; 
(iv) the distinction between the company and the its members is “no 
merely artificial and technical thing” and is “a matter of substance[;]” 
(v) property vested in the company is property of the company and the 
company’s property cannot be regarded as vested in any of its 
members.273 
The court then analysed whether the acquisition had taken 
place in fraudem legis (i.e. in fraud of the law). It stated the basic principle 
as follows: 
[A] transaction is in fraudem legis when it is designedly 
disguised so as to escape the provisions of the law, but 
falls in truth within these provisions. Thus stated, the 
rule is merely a branch of the fundamental doctrine 
that the law regards the substance rather than the form 
of things, —a doctrine common, one would think, to 
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every system of jurisprudence. . . . And if that be so, 
then there is no practical difference between our rule 
on this point and the rule of English law.274 
Having expressed the view (based upon the English decision 
of Salomon that the company was an entity separate and distinct from 
its member and that the South African doctrine of “simulation” was 
similar to that enunciated in English law), the court had to deal with 
the Daimler case. At first blush there was little to distinguish the facts 
of Daimler from the facts of Dadoo other than that the legislation sought 
to be enforced in Dadoo (the prohibition of land ownership by Asiatics) 
was unjust and plainly unpalatable to the court.275 However, the court 
distinguished Daimler on the somewhat tenuous basis that “[a] 
company cannot have an enemy character . . .  [b]ut it can own land.”276 
The court also pointed out that Daimler was in any event difficult to 
reconcile with Salomon, which had established that a company was a 
separate and distinct legal personality.277 
The wheel came full circle on this issue in the newly democratic 
South Africa in Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd. v. City Manager, City of 
Cape Town.278 In that case, the court held that a juristic person can be 
the victim of racial discrimination if its shareholders are historically 
disadvantaged individuals.279 The court distinguished Dadoo and 
followed Daimler.280 
                                                 
 274 Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 at 547. Cf. 
Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 at 315 (Eng.); Snook v. 
London & West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] 1 All ER 518 at 528; Yukong Line 
Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. [1998] 4 All ER 82 at 94; DeWitt Truck Brokers 
Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976). 
 275 Chief Justice Innes stated “No doubt these enactments were passed in 
furtherance of a policy of social, political and economic inequality as between white 
and coloured inhabitants of the Republic.” Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 
AD 530, 549 (S. Afr.). 
 276 Id. at 552. 
 277 Id. at 551. 
 278 See generally Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd. v. City Manager, City of Cape Town 
2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC). 
 279 Id. at 655–56 paras. 34–35. 
 280 Id. at 655 paras. 32–33. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:1 
160 
Ironically, the Dadoo court refused to pierce the corporate veil 
in part to protect the shareholders from racial discrimination,281 
whereas the Manong court pierced the corporate veil in order to protect 
the shareholders from discrimination in an environment where striving 
for racial equality has become the constitutional norm.282 
Once again, as in the cases of Daimler and Dadoo, the Manong 
Court was influenced by politics and current public policy in the forum 
in the manner in which it applied the law to the facts. 
D. Towards a General Principle 
As appears from what is more fully set forth below, the South 
African courts have, prior to the enactment of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 (“the New Companies Act”), generally followed English law 
principles in determining whether to pierce or lift the corporate veil. 
However, more recent cases have attempted to establish a general 
principle and at the same time affirm that the courts in post-
constitutional South Africa should adopt a more liberal and less 
hidebound approach to the subject.283 
To some extent, the need for further development of South 
African law to allow for more veil piercing in order to render a 
shareholder liable for a debt owed to a creditor of the company has 
been inhibited by the presence of alternative remedies that make veil 
piercing less necessary. In this respect, section 424 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 (“the Old Companies Act”), which is still applicable 
after the enactment of the New Companies Act,284 provides for 
personal liability of any person “who was knowingly a party to the 
carrying on of [a company’s] business” in way that was “reckless[] or 
[done] with intent to defraud creditors of the company. . . .” 
Section 64(1) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (“the 
Close Corporations Act”) (which applies to smaller closely held 
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corporations) provides personal liability where the business of the 
close corporation was carried on “recklessly, with gross negligence or 
with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. . . .” 
This means that, where the court finds that there is reckless or 
fraudulent conduct by the controlling shareholder, there is often no 
need to pierce the corporate veil in order to render the shareholder 
personally liable. 
In Shipping Corporation of India Limited v. Evdomon Corporation,285 
the Appellate Division considered an application to attach a shipping 
vessel that belonged to a company that was wholly owned by the 
Government of India.286 The applicant sought to attach the vessel to 
found jurisdiction for a lawsuit against the Government of India.287 
The issue therefore arose whether the Government of India could be 
treated as the owner of the vessel instead of the shipping company in 
whose name the vessel was registered.288 The court held that the mere 
fact that the Government of India was the sole shareholder in the 
corporation did not entitle the court to lift the corporate veil.289 
In approaching the subject, the court first cited to the basic 
principle enunciated in Dadoothat “[a] registered company is a legal 
persona distinct from the members who compose it.”290  The court then 
held: 
It seems to me that generally it is of cardinal 
importance to keep distinct the property rights of a 
company and those of its shareholders, even where the 
latter is a single entity, and that the only permissible 
deviation from this rule known to our law occurs in 
those (in practice) rare cases where the circumstances 
justify ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil. And in 
this regard it should not make any difference whether 
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the shares be held by a holding company or by a 
Government. I do not find it necessary to consider, or 
attempt to define, the circumstances on which the 
Court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice it to say 
that they would generally have to include an element of 
fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment 
or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs. In 
this connection, the words ‘device’, ‘strategem’, ‘cloak’ 
and ‘sham’ have been used.291 
In Cape Pacific Limited v. Lubner Controlling Investments,292 the 
South African Appellate Division was faced with a situation similar to 
the one that had arisen in England in Jones v Lipman,293 which the court 
cited to in support of its judgment.294 The plaintiff had bought shares 
in a property owning company, from one Lubner.295 Lubner 
transferred the shares in the property owning company to another 
company that he controlled in order to prevent the plaintiff from 
asserting its rights under the agreement of sale.296 The court pierced 
the corporate veil and held that the transferee company could be 
ordered to deliver the shares to the plaintiff just as if the shares had 
remained vested in Lubner.297 
In arriving at its decision, the court enunciated the following 
main principles in determining whether or not to pierce the corporate 
veil: (i) the law will have regard to substance over form;298 (ii) the court 
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has no “general discretion simply to disregard” the separate personality 
of the company merely because it thinks that it is “just to do so[;]”299 
(iii) the courts would pierce the corporate veil where “fraud, dishonesty 
or other improper conduct” is found in the administration of the 
corporation[;]300 (iv) “[i]t is not necessary that a company should have 
been conceived and founded in deceit. . . .” It is enough if it is currently 
behaving fraudulently or improperly;301 and (v) veil piercing is 
available, even where another remedy exists.302 
Despite the fact that South African courts have defined the 
requirements of piercing the corporate veil in broad discretionary 
terms, the Cape Pacific court relied upon and endorsed a number of 
English law decisions, including Salomon, Jones v. Lipman, Gilford Motors 
and Cape Industries.303 The close inter-relationship between English and 
South African law has therefore been made very clear.304 
As noted above, the application of constitutional principles in 
accordance with Section 35 of the Constitution has heralded in a more 
liberal, flexible approach in developing the common law. This is 
evident in some of the post-constitutional decisions on piercing the 
corporate veil. 
In Ebrahim v. Airport Cold Storage305 the court held: 
In contrast with the United Kingdom, where it seems 
the equivalent provisions have in recent years ‘been 
very rarely used’ to fasten directors with personal 
liability,306 the jurisprudence of this Court evidences 
claimants’ spirited reliance on the provision. Though 
courts will never ‘lightly disregard’ a corporation’s 
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separate identity, nor likely find recklessness, such 
conclusions when merited can only help in keeping 
corporate governance true.307 
This is sound common sense. 
In Ex Parte Gore NO the South African court (Binns-Ward, J) 
conducted a thorough review of both English and South African law 
in an attempt to define the general principles applicable to piercing the 
corporate veil before the enactment of the New Companies Act.308 The 
court came to the following conclusions: (i) In the 1960s–1970s, South 
African courts indicated a greater “willingness to ignore the separate 
personality of individual companies in the group context. . . .”309 (ii) 
however, in recent years, the courts have followed the more current 
conservative trend of the English courts evidenced in Adams v. Cape 
Industries[;]310 (iii) recent cases have also indicated that “the separate 
personality of juristic persons should only be disregarded in 
exceptional circumstances and as a last resort[;]”311 (iv) careful analysis 
of the South African authorities does show that the courts will, 
however, go behind the veil where that is “just and equitable” and that 
remedy is not limited to places where “there is no alternative 
remedy[;]”312 (v) fraud is not an essential element for piercing the 
corporate veil.313 
Having summarised these general principles, Binns-Ward J 
summed up the approach of the South African courts as follows: 
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In my view the determination to disregard the 
distinctness provided in terms of a company’s separate 
legal personality appears in each case to reflect a policy 
based decision resultant upon a weighing by the court 
of the importance of giving effect to the legal concept 
of juristic personality, acknowledging the material 
practical and legal considerations that underpin the 
legal fiction, on the other hand, as against the adverse 
moral and economic effects of countenancing an 
unconscionable abuse of the concept by the founders, 
shareholders, or controllers of a company, on the 
other.314 
The balancing act proposed by Binns-Ward J in the latter 
paragraph pragmatically recognises the difficulties in trying to reconcile 
the various judgments on this issue. It is a frank assessment of how the 
courts really seem to arrive at what is in essence a policy-based decision 
in most cases—they weigh the need to protect the separate juristic 
personality of the company against other values that have to be 
recognised in the public interest. 
The court’s judgment in Ex Parte Gore also contains a 
perspicacious and pithy analysis of the English authorities on the 
subject.315 Apart from its utility as a summary, it demonstrates how 
closely tied South African law on the subject is to the English law. 
However, the heavy reliance on English law by the South African 
courts obscures the more liberal nature of veil piercing and the alter 
ego doctrine in post-constitutional South Africa. The advent of the 
Constitution and its requirement that the common law be developed 
in order to conform to the values of the Constitution has inevitably 
heralded a more liberal and equity oriented approach to the law. In the 
context of piercing the corporate veil, it should ameliorate the severity 
of the English law with respect to corporate veil piercing and infuse 
the courts with the desire to do equity where that is possible without 
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doing violence to necessary legal and commercial principles like the 
concept of separate juristic personality. 
E. Piercing the Corporate Veil under the New Companies Act 
Section 20(9) of the New Companies Act has introduced a 
statutory basis for piercing or lifting the corporate veil. It provides: 
If, on the application of an interested person or in any 
proceedings in which a company is involved, a court 
finds that the incorporation of the company, or any use 
of the company, or any act by or on behalf of the 
company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the 
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, 
the court may: 
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not 
to be a juristic person in respect of any right, obligation 
or liability of a company or of a shareholder of the 
company or, in the case of a non-profit company, a 
member of the company, or of another person 
specified in the declaration; and 
(b) make any further order of the court the court 
considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration 
contemplated in paragraph (a). 
In Ex Parte Gore, Binns-Ward J enunciated the following 
principles with regard to section 20(9) of the New Companies Act: (i) 
prior to the enactment of the statute, piercing or setting aside the veil 
was governed by common law. The introduction of a statutory 
provision was likely to “erode the . . . philosophy” that piercing the 
corporate veil should only take place in exceptional circumstances. “By 
expressly establishing its availability simply when the facts of a case 
justify it,” the legislature indicated that the remedy should not be 
regarded as “exceptional, or ‘drastic[;]’”316 (ii) the use of the term 
                                                 
 316 Id. at 399 para. 34 (citing Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 
558 (C) at para. 23 (S. Afr.); Knoop N.O. and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) Ltd. and 
Others [2009] ZAFSHC 67, at para. 23). 
2019 The Mystery of the Corporate Veil 7:1 
167 
“unconscionable abuse” in the statute instead of “gross abuse” also extends 
the availability of the remedy because the former term implies a less 
stringent test than the latter;317 (iii) “[t]he term ‘unconscionable abuse 
of the juristic personality’ encompasses common law terms such as 
‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem[,]’” previously used in connection with veil 
piercing cases but also goes further. The remedy is available “whenever 
the illegitimate use of the concept of juristic personality adversely 
affects a third party in a way that reasonably should not be 
countenanced[;]”318 (iv) the statute is “supplemental” to the common 
law and does not substitute it;319 and (v) the remedy is available even 
when there may be an alternative remedy.320 
In short, the effect of the enactment of Section 20(9) of the 
New Companies Act is to considerably enlarge the scope of the 
common law veil piercing remedy in South African law. The test 
enunciated by Binns-Ward J is considerably more fluid than the 
principles set out in prior decisions. It remains to be seen whether 
South African appeal courts will be able to overcome their inherent 
conservatism on this issue and significantly broaden the scope of the 
remedy. 
F. Groups of Companies and the Agency Principles in South Africa 
The group/agency principle first reared its head in South 
Africa in Adcock-Ingram Laboratories Limited v. Lennon Limited, the issue 
in that case was whether the use of a trademark by a subsidiary 
company of the proprietor of the trademark constituted a “permitted 
use” by the proprietor/holding company.321  The court, led by 
Nicholas J, held that there was no evidence that the subsidiary 
company was using the trademark as the agent of the holding 
company.322 The mere fact that the subsidiary was subject to the 
control of the holding company did not mean that there was a 
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relationship of agent and principal between them. There was no 
contract of agency, either express or implied.323 
The matter arose again some five years later before the same 
judge (who was now sitting in the Appellate Court) in Ritz Hotel Limited 
v. Charles of the Ritz Limited.324 The issue was a similar one—whether 
the use of a trademark by a holding company of the respondent, 
Charles of the Ritz, amounted to a “permitted use” within the meaning 
of the relevant trademark law. Nicholas AJA questioned whether he 
had correctly decided the issue in Adcock Ingram.325 However, the facts 
of the Ritz Hotel case were slightly different in that the court held that, 
in exercising quality control over the goods manufactured, the holding 
company acted as the agent of the subsidiary.326 There was, therefore, 
a “permitted use” by the South African subsidiary.327 
Although the facts were slightly different, the approach of the 
court was also substantively different. Citing to DHN Food328 the court 
noted a more liberal approach by the English courts to treat 
subsidiaries in the group as a single economic entity.329 The South 
African court cited with apparent approval to a statement of Lord 
Denning in DHN Food that “[t]here is evidence of a general tendency 
to ignore the separate legal entities of various companies within a 
group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole 
group.”330 
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The court also cited with approval to the judgment of Dillon J 
in Revlon, Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Limited,331 which held that a narrow 
emphasis on the individuality of companies in a group “is not in 
accordance with recent authorities.”332 
Once again, it is necessary to emphasise that the courts in Ritz 
Hotel, DHN Food and Revlon were willing to be bold about enunciating 
a “single economic entity theory” when this was to the advantage of 
the companies in the group and did not have the effect of unfairly 
disadvantaging any third parties. The application of the doctrine in so 
limited a fashion carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. Why 
should the holding company in a group have the benefit of insulating 
itself from the liabilities of its subsidiary while at the same time 
claiming that the members of the group should be treated as one where 
that is to the benefit of the holding company? While it may be 
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil of companies in a single 
economic unit where this is to the benefit of a third party, it is unfair 
to allow a reverse veil piercing for the benefit of the entity that chose 
to set up such a convoluted corporate structure in the first place. 
The Ritz Hotel case was decided before Cape Industries finally 
discredited the “single economic entity theory” in England.333 After 
Cape Industries was decided, the issue of whether companies in a group 
could be treated as a single economic entity came before the South 
African court again in Wambach v. Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk.334 This 
was a tort claim. The Appellate Division refused to pierce the 
corporate veil to hold that damage done by a mechanical horse and 
trailer registered in the name of a wholly owned subsidiary (which 
shared the same directors with the holding company) should be treated 
as a tort committed by the holding company.335 The court noted that 
piercing the corporate veil to treat all companies in the group as one 
                                                 
 331 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at 315 H-J 
(citing Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. 1980 FSR 85 (Ch) at 95 (Eng.)). 
 332 Ritz Hotel Ltd. v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd. 1988 (3) SA 290 (A) at 315 H-J 
(quoting Revlon Inc. v. Cripps & Lee Ltd. 1980 FSR 85 (Ch) at 95 (Eng.)). 
 333 Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1016 (Eng.). 
 334 See generally Wambach v. Maizecor Industries (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669 
(AD). 
 335 Id. at 671, 675 B-D. 
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would lead to “total darkness.”336 Nobody would know what the status 
of a trademark was or who had property rights in things like the 
mechanical trailer at issue.337 
In Macadamia Finance Bpk v. De Wet, the court also endorsed 
Cape Industries and concluded that the liquidators (trustees) of a holding 
company in liquidation had no duty to insure the assets of the 
subsidiary company.338 
In Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema,339 the issue arose again in a fairly 
unusual context: the Master of the High Court340 set aside an 
assignment341 from a company called MAK to a related entity, the 
applicant, Al-Kharafi.342 The assignment had been effected so that Al-
Kharafi would be able to set-off a debt that it owed to the insolvent 
company against a debt owed by the insolvent company to MAK.343 
Al-Kharafi argued, based upon cases like DHN Food, that the 
court should ignore the assignment from MAK to Kharafi because 
they were members of a single economic entity and that, as a result, 
there had been no assignment in substance.344 The applicant contended 
for a “reverse piercing of the veil” — i.e., the applicant was voluntarily 
asking the court to pierce the corporate veil to assist it rather than to 
saddle it with liability.345 
The court delivered a carefully reasoned judgment analysing 
(and ultimately following) the post-Cape Industries English law on this 
                                                 
 336 Id. at 675 B-D. 
 337 Id. 
 338 Id. at 744, 748 A-F. 
 339 Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) (S. Afr.). 
 340 An official charged with the overall administration of an insolvent 
company in South Africa. See Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, § 1. 
 341 Called a “cession” in South Africa. See 2 WA Joubert & JA Faris Law of 
South Africa: Part 2: para 1 (W.A. Joubert & J.A. Faris eds. LexisNexis Durban: 2nd 
Ed: 2003). 
 342 Al-Kharafi & Sons v Pema 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) at 360–61. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Id. at 368 para. 9. 
 345 Id. at 380 para. 30 (citing “Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa (first 
reissue) vol 4(1) para 42”) 
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subject.346 Based upon the more conservative trends in English law as 
embodied in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council and Adams v. Cape 
Industries, the court held that the “single economic entity” theory did 
not apply in South Africa.347 
The court rejected the concept that the corporate veil ought to 
be pierced “where the interests of justice require it.”348 Ultimately, the 
court held that this was, in any event, an inappropriate situation in 
which to pierce the corporate veil.349 
The court also rejected the applicant’s defence because Kharafi 
was not a shareholder, directly or indirectly, in MAK.350 Although they 
had common shareholders, they were entirely separate entities. The 
court held that it was “trite that when a court pierces the corporate veil 
it treats the assets and liabilities of the company as assets and liabilities 
of the shareholder.”351 
Accordingly, for better or for worse the South African courts 
have rejected the “single economic entity theory.” A holding company 
cannot be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary simply because they 
are companies within a group. 
IV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN THE U.S. 
At first blush, English and American law on this subject may 
appear to be different, but there are significant similarities. Both 
jurisdictions have attempted to lay down general principles while at the 
same time seeking to preserve a significant amount of discretion for 
the courts to respond to the rich ingenuity of human dishonesty. The 
judicial opinions of both jurisdictions tend to emphasise that a 
corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its members before 
                                                 
 346 Id. at 382–88 paras. 33–39. 
 347 Id. at 384–88 paras. 35–39. 
 348 It was the applicant in this case who asserted this argument, which the 
court quoted. Id. at 383, 386 paras. 34, 36. Cf. Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 
115 at 154–55 paras. 160–61. 
 349 Id. at 387–88 para. 39. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. at 387 para. 38. 
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explaining why the court should or should not pierce the corporate veil 
in the particular instance before it.352 
It is apparent from the English and South African cases 
analysed above that legal systems that adhere more closely to English 
Company Law have been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to hold 
a shareholder liable for the debts of the company. They have been less 
reluctant to lift the veil and treat a shareholder and its subsidiary as one 
to prevent a dishonest shareholder from utilising a corporation as a 
sham to skim assets or to conduct activities in violation of a legal 
obligation. In contrast, American courts have more frequently 
(although not necessarily easily) permitted the veil to be pierced to hold 
a shareholder liable for the debts of his company and there are many 
examples of this in federal law and in the jurisprudence of the fifty 
states.353 
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a comparative 
approach to veil piercing in every legal jurisdiction of the United States. 
I have, therefore, chosen to focus on a small number of federal and 
state cases which set out the general principles that seem to be followed 
in most U.S. jurisdictions. 
An empirical study undertaken by Professor Robert B. 
Thompson354 notes that “[p]iercing the corporate veil is the most 
litigated issue in [American] corporate law. . . .”355 Although there are 
no similar statistical studies in England and South Africa, a careful 
search of the legal reports in both jurisdictions will produce only a 
limited number of veil piercing cases and even fewer successful ones. 
In contrast, Thompson found that in the 1,583 reported U.S. cases on 
piercing the corporate veil, 40% of the cases resulted in a veil piercing 
in which the court held the shareholder liable for the debts of its 
                                                 
 352 See generally Pacific Canning Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1938); 
DeWitt Truck Brokers Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 
22 (HL) (Eng.); Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530 (S. Afr.); Cape 
Pacific Ltd. v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 807. 
 353 See GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 60–111. 
 354 See THOMPSON, supra note 5. 
 355 Id. at 1036. 
2019 The Mystery of the Corporate Veil 7:1 
173 
company.356 Interestingly, Delaware, the state in which most major 
U.S. companies are incorporated, has produced no reported successful 
veil piercing cases.357 
Thompson notes that there are no instances in which the 
corporate veil has been pierced to impose liability on public 
shareholders and that the larger the number of shareholders in a 
company, the lower the statistical likelihood of corporate veil 
piercing.358 There is nothing in the stated legal principles of most U.S. 
jurisdictions that would account for the significantly greater incidence 
of veil piercing in the US as compared to England and South Africa. 
The real explanation may be this. The decision to pierce the corporate 
veil is a balancing act and the way in which courts resolve it has more 
to do with the public morals and commercial realities of the 
jurisdiction in which the veil piercing claim is made. 
A. The Template Approach 
A common approach of U.S. courts is to utilise a list of 
potential grounds for piercing the corporate veil, and when some or all 
of them are present with a sufficiently egregious array of facts, the 
corporate veil is pierced. Gevurtz calls this the “template approach.”359 
In DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Company360 
the Fourth Circuit enunciated the following principles with regard to 
the factors that justify corporate veil piercing:  (i) the court recognised 
that the circumstances in which a court would pierce the corporate veil 
have been “rarely articulated with any clarity[.]” The court noted that 
this was perhaps the case because every case was sui generis depending 
                                                 
 356 THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1048. 
 357 Id. at 1051–53. Thompson attributes this to the fact that “Delaware’s 
traditional focus has been on large corporations” with multiple shareholders, with 
publicly traded securities in many instances. Id. But perhaps it also speaks to a more 
conservative public morality that recognises how important limited liability is to the 
state’s economy. 
 358 Id. at 1054–55. 
 359 GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 71. 
 360 DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 (4th 
Cir. 1976). 
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upon its underlying facts;361 (ii) proof of “plain fraud” is not a necessary 
element in a finding to disregard the corporate veil;362 (iii) where 
substantial ownership of all of the stock is in the hands of a single 
individual and there has been a disregard of “the corporate fiction[,]” 
the courts had little difficulty in applying the “alter ego” or 
“instrumentality” theory in order to set aside the corporate veil and 
“fasten liability on the individual stockholder[;]”363 (iv) regarding the 
application of both the instrumentality and the alter ego doctrine, the 
courts “are concerned with reality and not form. . . .”364 (v) where a 
one man or closely held corporation is “grossly undercapitalized for 
the purposes of the corporate undertaking” that will usually justify 
piercing the corporate veil.365 Other factors that can be taken into 
account are a “failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment 
of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor corporation366 . . . syphoning 
of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder, non-
functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, and the fact that the corporation is merely a fa[ç]ade for the 
operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders[;]”367 (vi) the 
decision to disregard the corporate veil cannot rest on a single factor. 
It must involve a number of factors and there must also be present an 
“element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.”368 
                                                 
 361 Id. at 684 (quoting Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859, 861–62 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
Cf. the South African case of Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 
1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 805 B-C (commenting on the difficulties in stating a general 
rule because circumstances could be so varied); the English case of Adams v. Cape 
Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1025. 
 362 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 684–85. 
 363 Id. at 685. 
 364 Id.. Cf. Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) 
SA 790 (AD) at 803 (holding that veil piercing was justified in cases of fraud or 
“improper conduct”). 
 365 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 685. 
 366 This really overlaps with undercapitalisation. 
 367 Id. at 686–87. The term “façade” is a really a conclusion rather than a fact. 
In my opinion, it should not be utilised so frequently that it obscures the need to 
find the necessary factors present for piercing the veil. 
 368 Id. at 687. See United States v. Pisani 646 F.2d 83, 88 (1981) (the court 
followed the DeWitt template and held that it set out a federal standard for corporate 
veil piercing). See generally United States v. Golden Acres, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1097 (D.Del. 
1988) (the court followed DeWitt and Pisani); Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., 
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In comparison, English and South African courts both hold 
that the corporate veil cannot be pierced merely because it is “in the 
interests of justice” to do so.369 However, the De Witt approach 
requires “an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness” in 
addition to the presence of more than one of the factors listed in the 
template.370 As more is required than mere injustice, American, English 
and South African law are not fundamentally different on this issue. It 
is also interesting to note how similar the template list of factors is to 
the list of factors that the English court considered in Cape Industries in 
deciding whether the U.S. company, NAAC, was simply an agent of 
Cape.371 
In Harper v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc.372 the United States 
District Court interpreted Delaware state law as follows: 
Both courts373 noted that “no single factor could justify 
a decision to disregard the corporate entity, but . . . 
some combination of them was required, and that an 
overall element of injustice or unfairness must always 
be present, as well.” Simply phrased, the standard may 
be restated as: “whether [the two entities] operate as a 
single economic entity such that it would inequitable 
for this Court to uphold a legal distinction between 
them.”374 
                                                 
Del. Ch. C.A. No.1131; Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raisings Mgmt., 519 
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 71 (listing the template factors). 
 369 Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 154 para. 160 (Eng.); Ex 
Parte Gore No 2013 (3) SA 382 (WCC) at 396 para. 28 (S. Afr.). 
 370 DeWitt Truck Brokers, 540 F.2d at 687. 
 371 Adams v. Cape Indus. PLC (1991) 1 All ER 929 at 1027. 
 372 Harper v. Del. Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076 (D.Del. 1990). 
 373 Id. at 1085 ((citing Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Green Farms, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. 
No. 1131, Hartnett, V.C., slip op. at 10, 1989 WL 110537 (Sept. 19, 1989)). 
 374 Harper, 743 F. Supp. at 1085 (quoting Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Texas 
American Energy Corp., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 8576, Berger, V.C., mem. op. at 12, 1990 
WL 44267 (Apr. 12, 1990));. Cf. Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Lord Mayor [1939] 4 
All ER 116 at 120–121; DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower 
Hamlet [1976] 3 All ER 462 at 467 467; rejected by the English court in Woolfson 
v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council 1978 SLT 159 at 161. 
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Harper was not endorsing piercing the corporate veil simply 
when two entities were “a single economic entity.” It is clear from the 
quotation above that it is only where the entities constitute a single 
economic entity and there are sufficient template factors present that 
piercing the corporate veil will be warranted.375 
In some ways, the template approach of U.S. jurisprudence is 
a little more definitive, and therefore it should, by its very nature, be 
more limiting than the English and South African tests. By creating a 
list of factors and requiring that more than one of them be present 
together with an “overall element of injustice or unfairness” the court 
impliedly excludes veil piercing where only one of those factors is 
possible or where there is no “overall element of injustice or 
unfairness.”376 
Gevurtz377 comments with some exasperation on the confusing 
and somewhat inconsistent manner in which U.S. courts have applied 
the template approach. The author makes the point that it is not clear 
what weight each factor should be given in conducting an evaluation.378 
He notes that some factors that the courts consider (such as non-
payment of dividends or a mere failure to observe corporate 
formalities) may be neutral in their effect upon the creditor who seeks 
to pierce the veil.379 
Perhaps Gevurtz is overestimating the problem; the case law is 
very clear that one factor alone will not suffice. While it might not be 
clear exactly how much weight to give each factor, the template has 
significant advantages in that it affords greater guidance to the courts 
than the more vague and general approach of the English and South 
African courts while at the same time retaining flexibility. Although I 
have differentiated between the template approach and the 
instrumentality theory, application of the one does not exclude the 
                                                 
 375 See Harper, 743 F. Supp. at 1085. 
 376 See id. 
 377 GEVURTZ, supra note 147, at 60–61. 
 378 Id. at 71. 
 379 Id. at 71–72. 
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other. The courts can combine the two factors in their analysis, as 
happened in De Witt.380 
Thompson’s empirical analysis demonstrates that, where certain 
factors are mentioned they may carry greater weight in the court’s 
decision to pierce the corporate veil.381 For example, where 
“instrumentality” was mentioned, it resulted in veil piercing in 97.33% 
of cases; when under-capitalisation was mentioned, it resulted in veil 
piercing in 73% of cases; where an overlap in business activities 
between corporations was noted, it resulted in veil piercing 81% of the 
time.382 
In summary, the “template” approach considers a variety of 
factors, more than one of which must be present for the court to 
disregard the corporate form. In addition, there must be “an overall 
element of injustice or unfairness.”383 As each case must be treated on 
its own facts, the courts have avoided being too didactic in what weight 
should be given to each factor. 
B. Agency, Instrumentality and Alter Ego 
A number of U.S. cases approach the question of whether a 
corporation should be liable for the debts of its subsidiary on an 
agency, “instrumentality” or alter ego principle. The manner in which 
American courts have applied this principle to subsidiaries is not 
significantly different from the approach of the English court in Adams 
v Cape Industries. 
One of the earlier American cases that enunciated the 
agency/instrumentality principle was Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes.384 The 
Ninth Circuit enunciated the following principles: (i) a corporation “is 
an entity, distinct in itself[;]” (ii) however, where “resourcefulness of 
                                                 
 380 See generally DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming 540 F.2d 681, 
685–687 (4th Cir. 1976). 
 381 See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1063–64. 
 382 Id. 
 383 Harper v. Del. Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (D.Del. 
1990). See generally DeWitt Truck Brothers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
 384 Pacific Can Co. v. Hewes 95 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1938). 
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man caused a corporation to be used as a scapegoat for another[,]” the 
Courts “checked the evil” by piercing the corporate veil; (iii) the 
corporate veil will be disregarded where the corporation is “so 
organized and controlled” that it simply constitutes “an instrumentality 
or adjunct of another corporation[;]” (iv) dominion over the subsidiary 
“may be so complete” and “interference so obtrusive” that by ordinary 
laws of agency the parent, as principal, will be liable for the actions of 
its agent, the corporation; (v) where control is even worse than this, 
veil piecing can be based upon “honesty and justice.”385 
Accordingly, liability can be based on the application of 
conventional agency principles as well as upon an instrumentality 
principle that seeks to unravel a fraud. If the corporation is in fact the 
agent of the shareholder, liability can be imposed without proof of 
fraud. 
In Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,386 the court 
enunciated the instrumentality test as follows: 
The ‘instrumentality’ rule may be formulated as 
follows: Where a parent corporation at the time of the 
transaction complained of (1) exercises control over its 
subsidiary not in a manner not normal and usual with 
stockholders, but to such extent and in such manner, 
in disregard of the subsidiary’s corporate 
paraphernalia, directors, and officers, that the 
subsidiary has become a mere instrumentality or 
department of the parent’s own business and the 
parent, under the unreal form of the subsidiary, is the 
real actor in the transaction; or where the business and 
officers of the two corporations have become so 
inextricably confused that it is impossible or 
impracticable to identify the corporation that 
participated in the transaction attacked; and (2) where 
such control has been used by the parent to commit 
fraud, or violate other legal duty, or has been used to 
                                                 
 385 Id. at 45–46. This is similar to the Anglo-South African approach. 
 386 Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D 144 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 
6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936). 
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do an act tainted by dishonesty or unjust conduct 
violating plaintiff’s rights (or under circumstances 
giving rise to an estoppel); and (except in estoppel 
cases) (3) where such fraud or wrong results in unjust 
loss or injury to plaintiff, the court, in disregard of the 
corporate entity of the subsidiary, will hold the parent 
liable. Even without the preceding restrictions and 
limitations, the parent corporation will be liable where 
the parent has expressly made a subsidiary its agent or 
has itself committed the tort in suit,387 as, for example, 
in the railroad system cases relating to personal injuries 
where the employees committing the tort were held to 
be the immediate employees of the parent as well as of 
the subsidiary.388 
Accordingly, the holding company can be held liable not only 
under the instrumentality theory (which is a fairly onerous test as laid 
out in the judgment), but also on the basis that the parent corporation 
has expressly made its subsidiary an agent. Insofar as a U.S. court may 
employ a pure agency theory, the analysis would be closer to that of 
the English courts in cases like Smith Stone & Knight. The three-pronged 
test enunciated in Lowendahl is theoretically more onerous than the test 
adopted by English and South African courts for determining whether 
the subsidiary is merely an agent for the shareholder because it requires 
proof of dishonesty, violation of a legal duty, or other unjust conduct, 
and that that behaviour proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.389 
In Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp.,390 the court considered 
whether one of the defendants was the “alter ego” of a corporation. 
Citing to Wallace v. Tulsa Yellowcab Taxi Baggage Co., the court held that 
                                                 
 387 This may explain why the courts will pierce the corporate veil less often 
in tort cases than in contract matters. If the shareholder is a party to the tort, then 
the shareholder can be liable on ordinary principles of tort law. If the shareholder is 
not a party to the tort, there is no reason to pierce the corporate veil. See United States 
v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, at 61 (1998). 
 388 Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D 144, 156–57 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1936). 
 389 See id. 
 390 Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793–94 (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
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under circumstances where “‘the corporation is so organized and 
controlled and its affairs so conducted that it is merely an 
instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation’ the two 
corporations will no longer be considered distinct legal entities.”391 In 
short, the court appeared to consider that the alter ego theory was just 
another term for instrumentality. 
The court held that the following factors should be taken into 
account in making the determination: 
(1) whether the dominant corporation owns or 
subscribes to all the subservient corporations stock, (2) 
whether the dominant and subservient corporations 
have common directors and officers, (3) whether the 
dominant corporation provides financing to the 
subservient corporation, (4) whether the subservient 
corporation is grossly undercapitalised, (5) whether the 
dominant corporation pays the salaries, expenses or 
losses of the subservient corporation, (6) whether most 
of the subservient corporation’s business is with the 
dominant corporation or the subservient corporation’s 
assets were conveyed from the dominant corporation, 
(7) whether the dominant corporation refers to the 
subservient corporation as a division or department, 
(8) whether the subservient corporation’s officers or 
directors follow the dominant corporation’s directions, 
and (9) whether the corporations observed the legal 
formalities for keeping the entities separate.392 
These cases reveal that there is significant overlap between the 
template approach and the instrumentality or alter ego doctrines. 
However, the template approach is concerned more specifically with 
misconduct in the administration of the corporation while the 
                                                 
 391 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Tulsa Yellowcab Taxi Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61 
P.2d 645, 648 (1936)). 
 392 Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793 (10th Cir. 
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instrumentality approach is more focused on the issue of dominance 
by one person or entity over another. The indicia utilised in Hamilton 
seeks to resolve the control issue.393 
In Japan Petroleum Company (Nigeria) Limited v. Ashland Oil,394 the 
court considered the agency or instrumentality theory in the context of 
an international corporate group. The plaintiff sought to hold the 
defendant, a Kentucky corporation, liable for the debts of two of its 
wholly owned subsidiaries engaged in oil exploration in Nigeria. In 
language that looks very similar (but is more succinct) than that of the 
English court in Adams v. Cape Industries, the court refused to pierce the 
corporate veil.395 It held that the Nigerian subsidiaries were not under 
the “complete domination or control” of the American holding 
company.396 The Nigerian companies were in every sense operating 
companies. Under Nigerian law, the subsidiaries could not have 
engaged in petroleum exploration and production activity unless they 
were Nigerian corporations conducting their own operations.397 
The court enunciated the following principles: (i) it is not 
necessary to prove fraud or inequity in order to demonstrate that there 
is an agency relationship between a parent and subsidiary;398 (ii) the 
central factual issue in determining whether an agency relationship 
exists is the issue of control—“whether the parent corporation 
dominates the activities of the subsidiary[;]”399 (iii) the fact that one 
corporation controls the majority of voting shares in another; that the 
two companies have common officers and directors, and that the 
parent corporation finances the operations of the subsidiaries do not 
necessarily support a finding that the subsidiary is “a mere agent or 
instrumentality for the parent[;]”400 (iv) in order to decide whether an 
agency relationship exists, the court looks to a “wide variety of 
                                                 
 393 See Hamilton v. Water Whole Intern. Corp. 302 Fed. App’x 789, 793–94 (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
 394 Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 456 F. Supp. 831, 834 (D.Del. 1978). 
 395 Id. at 845–46. 
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factors,” such as stock ownership, common officers and directors, 
financing, “responsibility for day-to-day operations, arrangements for 
payment of salaries and expenses and, [the] origin of [the] subsidiary’s 
business and assets[;]”401 (v) an important factor in determining 
whether the Nigerian company was not an agent of the US company 
was that the Nigerian company was an operating company and not 
merely a a shell corporation, which was responsible for mining 
exploration and efforts of production, employees’ conduct and “many 
of the day-to-day operations in connection with these activities[;]”402 
(vi) “[a]rrangements by a parent and subsidiary for economy of 
expense and convenience of administration” did not necessarily 
establish an agency relationship.403 
A further factor in the court’s reasoning appears to have been 
that American corporations should be free to establish foreign 
subsidiaries with “common management programs which promote 
administrative convenience without destroying the immunity of the 
parent from liability for the obligations of its foreign 
subsidiaries. . . .”404 This suggests that, as in Adams v. Cape Industries, the 
U.S. court was concerned with protecting local companies from 
liability for the debts of foreign subsidiaries. 
In Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Limited, the court considered 
the liability of Charter Consolidated PLC under New Jersey law for the 
tort obligations of the very same Cape Industries that was the 
defendant in Adams v. Cape Industries.405 Charter had a controlling 
shareholding in Cape Industries, which was itself a public listed 
company. The plaintiffs argued that Cape Industries had admittedly set 
                                                 
 401 Id.; See generally Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Cont’l Oil Co. 231 A.2d 450 (The 
plaintiff sued Continental Oil, a Delaware corporation, for an injunction restraining 
the Delaware company’s Mexican subsidiary from filing certain lawsuits in Mexico. 
The court found that the Mexican subsidiary was an active corporation which held 
oil and development contracts with a Mexican government agency and was the actual 
operator under some of those contracts. Accordingly, the Mexican subsidiary could 
not be said to be the agent of the Delaware holding company). 
 401 Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 456 F. Supp. 831, 846 (D.Del. 1978). 
 402 Id. at 845. 
 403 Id. at 846. 
 404 Id. at 846. 
 405 Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 146–47 (3rd Cir. 1988). 
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up a U.S. subsidiary to insulate itself from liability for asbestos claims 
and for that reason Charter (its holding company) should be liable for 
its debts.406 The court rejected this argument.407 This is perhaps not 
surprising as Cape Industries was itself a listed company. There is no 
case in the United States that has held the shareholders of a listed 
company liable for the company’s debts.408 
In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed the principles 
enunciated in Japan Petroleum. The court reasoned that majority or even 
total control over stocks is insufficient to warrant piercing the 
corporate veil. The factors that should be taken into account in 
determining whether an agency or instrumentality relationship exists 
include “‘gross undercapitalization . . . failure to observe corporate 
formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insolvency of the debtor 
corporation . . . , siphoning of funds of the [subsidiary] by the 
dominant stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors, 
[and] absence of corporate records. . . .’”409 
As in DeWitt, the Craig Court conflated both the template and 
instrumentality tests.410 While this approach may not seem doctrinally 
pure and may leave the reader in confusion these cases again 
demonstrate how interrelated the template and instrumentality 
approaches are. 
In summary, the instrumentality theory requires a high degree 
of control by the parent of the subsidiary. That control must be 
exercised by the parent to commit fraud, violate a legal duty, or 
perform other unjust conduct. In addition, and significantly, the 
unlawful or unjust conduct must be the cause of the Plaintiff’s injury. 
In evaluating whether the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of its 
                                                 
 406 Id. 
 407 Id. at 152. 
 408 See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1055. 
 409 Id. at 150 (citing American Bell, Inc. v. Fed’n Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
 410 See id.; DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 
686–87 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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holding company, the Court may have regard to the various factors 
that have been listed above in the template approach. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the case law set out above demonstrates that in 
each one of the subject jurisdictions, the general principles applicable 
to corporate veil piercing are reasonably predictable. However, 
application of the facts to the law in each case is not always consistent. 
Corporate veil piercing in every jurisdiction requires the court to do a 
balancing act in which it weighs society’s interest in preserving separate 
corporate identity against the need to pierce or lift the veil where 
observance of corporate forms would produce an egregious result. 
Ultimately, outcomes are largely dependent upon the public policy of 
the forum at the time when the case comes before it. Pragmatic 
recognition of this reality explains why, despite similarities in the 
guiding principles in each jurisdiction, the outcome can be very 
different where the case is argued in England rather than in the state 
of California. 
The review of the case law set out above demonstrates that the 
legal principles appertaining to piercing the corporate veil are the least 
liberal in England. Ironically, though, the factors that should be 
considered in evaluating whether to pierce the corporate veil have been 
more carefully defined in U.S. jurisdictions. Although South African 
courts have propounded a broader and more liberal approach than 
perhaps even the American jurisdictions, they tend to follow the more 
conservative English approach in practice. However, the recent 
enactment of a statutory remedy for piercing the corporate veil is likely 
to significantly expand the scope of the remedy in the future. 
Enunciating general principles under American law is more 
difficult because of the greater frequency of corporate veil piercing 
litigation coupled with the fact that corporate law varies from state to 
state within the US. However, the general principles across the board 
seem to be fairly similar and reconcilable. Statistical variances from 
state to state may have more to do with differences in public morality 
than any significant legal principle. 
2019 The Mystery of the Corporate Veil 7:1 
185 
Despite the variances in outcomes between England, South 
Africa and the U.S. jurisdictions, one can extract certain general 
principles from all the cases that are consistent in all three of the 
subject legal systems. The similar general principles in each jurisdiction 
include the notion that a corporation has an identity separate and 
distinct from its shareholders and, as a general principle, its 
shareholders are not liable for the debts of the corporation.411 
Additionally, the jurisdictions share the principle that despite the fact 
that the controlling shareholder is a corporation rather than an 
individual does not change the outcome.412 Next, piercing the 
corporate veil is not the norm and should only take place in exceptional 
circumstances.413 Further, piercing the corporate veil is a discretionary 
remedy. Accordingly, the courts have intentionally avoided defining 
the principles in a way that might impose a straitjacket on the courts.414 
Also, the courts in these jurisdictions will pierce the corporate veil 
when the company is a sham, a façade or a simulation to enable a 
shareholder to carry out an illegal objective, a fraud, or an 
impropriety.415 Moreover, the courts may pierce the corporate veil to 
give effect to substance over form416 and none of the subject 
jurisdictions will pierce the corporate veil simply because it is in the 
                                                 
 411 See generally Salomon v. Salomon Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL); Dadoo Ltd. v. 
Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 550; United States v. Bestfoods 524 U.S. 51, 61 
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 412 See generally Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 60–61; Japan Petroleum Co. v. Ashland Oil, 
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 831, 841 (D.Del. 1978); Adams v. Cape Indus. [1991] All ER 929 
at 1026 (Eng.); Wambach v. Maizecor Indus. (Edms) Bpk 1993 (2) SA 669 (AD) (S. Afr.). 
 413 See Salomon v. Salomon Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) at 29–30; Shipping Corp. 
of India Ltd. v. Evdomon Corp. 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at 566 C-F; Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 
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 414 See generally Adams v. Cape Industries [1991] All ER 929 at 1025 (Eng.); 
Cape Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995(4) SA 790 (AD) at 803 
B-C (S. Afr.); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681. 
 415 See Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 155–56 (Eng.); ; Cape 
Pacific Ltd. v. Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd. 1995 (4) SA 790 (AD) at 803 C-G 
(S. Afr.); United States v. Pisani 646 F.2d 83, 87–89 (1981). 
 416 See Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 AC 307 at 315; 
Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council 1920 AD 530, 547; Pisani 646 F.2d at 87–89 
(1981); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. 540 F.2d 681, 685–88 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
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interests of justice to do so. Other factors must be present.417 Another 
common principle is that fraud is not a necessary element for veil 
piercing.418 Lastly, where a subsidiary company conducts no 
independent business of its own and is controlled entirely by its 
shareholder, the court may pierce the corporate veil on an agency, 
instrumentality or alter ego theory. However, piercing the corporate 
veil on this basis requires an unusual level of control by the 
shareholder, such that the corporation no longer has any mind or will 
of its own.419 
                                                 
 417 See Ben Hashem v. Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 at 154 para. 160 (Eng.); 
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